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Without Borders? Notes on Globalization as a Mobility Regime*

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While globalization is largely theorized in terms of trans-border flows, this article suggests an exploratory sociological framework for analyzing globalization as consisting of systemic processes of closure and containment. The suggested framework points at the emergence of a global mobility regime that actively seeks to contain social movement both within and across borders. The mobility regime is theorized as premised upon a pervasive “paradigm of suspicion” that conflates the perceived threats of crime, immigration, and terrorism, thus constituting a conceptual blueprint for the organization of global risk-management strategies. The article draws on multiple examples, singling out some elementary forms of the mobility regime, emphasizing the sociological affinity between guarded borders on the one hand and gated communities on the other. In particular, the article aims at theorizing the translation of the paradigm of suspicion into actual technologies of social screening designed to police the mobility of those social elements that are deemed to belong to suspect social categories. Specifically, the article points at biosocial profiling as an increasingly dominant technology of intervention. Biosocial profiling, in turn, is theorized in juxtaposition to other modalities of power, namely, legal and disciplinary measures.

Iddy Kaoungou, from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, told me that four of his friends had drowned trying to swim around the fence to Ceuta... For Europeans, crossing from Morocco to Ceuta means just a five minute walk in the sun—the Spanish immigration officer didn't even ask to open my passport once I had flashed the cover at him.¹

A significant body of literature indicates that the era of globalization is simultaneously an era of growing restrictions on movement (Blomley, Delaney, and Ford 2001; Sassen 1991, 1988). This scholarship reminds us that while globalization is a lived reality of hypermobility for a small social stratum of “cosmocrats” (Adams 1999), mobility is still a scarce resource and the overwhelming majority of the world's population is more or less permanently immobilized (Bauman 2002; Doyle and Nathan 2001).² Yet, regardless of the attention given to the widening mobility gap in the present era, globalization is predominantly theorized in terms of social openness and social fluidity.³ In fact, the very concept of “globalization” connotes and

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¹“Attacking Europe's Border Fences,” a report by Joseph Winter for the BBC News Online Service, April 13, 2004, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>.

²Bauman (2002) writes that 98 percent of the world's population never moves to another place to settle, while even in the United Kingdom, 50 percent of the population live within five miles of the place where they were born.

³See, for example, a special issue of *European Studies*, subtitled “Culture and Cooperation in Europe's Borderlands,” where almost all articles focus on cross-border cooperation and integration (Anderson et al. 2003).

presupposes some transcendental imagination and, accordingly, the typical notions that social scientists use to define, characterize, and theorize globalization are those of “networks,” “flows,” and “trans-nationalism” (or other types of “trans-” thereof). The imagery of the trans-national, in particular, regardless of whether the subject matter is confrontational activism, regulatory schemes, or corporate practices, seems to dominate the sociological imagination and to shape the visions of both the proponents of Trade-Without-Borders and the promoters of Doctors-Without-Borders. Thus, some theorists (Held et al. 1999; Castells 1996) discuss globalization in terms of a network society, others analyze globalization as trans-national capitalism (Sklair 1997; Gottdiener 1995; Harvey 1989; Soja 1989), still others (Lechner and Boli 2000; Appadurai 1996) describe globalization as a seamless flow of goods, services, ideas, technologies, cultural forms, organizational forms, and people, all more or less in agreement that globalization is largely about “free movement across national boundaries” and cross-border interdependencies (Anderson, O’Dowd, and Wilson 2003; Held 1995; Giddens 1990).⁴

This is not to say that globalization is theorized as a unidirectional and homogeneous process. Furthermore, I do not mean to suggest that globalization is theorized only in formal terms, as a set of transactions and cross-border flows. To the contrary, the meaning and consequences of globalization are highly contested and, moreover, globalization is now routinely theorized as a highly contradictory set of cultural and normative pressures, involving tensions between capitalism and democracy, the north and the south, the haves and have-nots, empire and multitude (Hardt and Negri 2000), McWorld and Jihad (Barber 1996), as well as between “globalizers” and a variety of so-called anti-globalization movements (Kellner 2002, 1999; de Sousa Santos 2002).

Of specific interest for present purposes is the juxtaposition of the “old” principles of national sovereignty and citizenship rights on the one hand and the emergence of a global regime of human rights on the other. Soysal (1994), for example, suggests that two institutionalized principles are at work in regard to immigration: national sovereignty and universal human rights. She finds that it is the latter, a new globalizing principle, which has become “a pervasive element of world culture” (1994:6), in fact announcing a postnational era that undermines the national order of citizenship. Soysal bases her theoretical postulates on studies of guest-workers in Europe. She shows that guest-workers with no formal citizenship rights managed to establish both local and cross-border social networks, thereby creating an on-the-ground necessity to develop a variety of new “patterns of incorporation” (1994:4) that transcend and bypass formal citizenship rights. Hence, she finds that under the new conditions of global migration and an emergent global regime of human rights, “the logic of personhood supersedes the logic of national citizenship” (1994:164) and that “citizenship is losing ground to a more universal model of membership anchored in transcendent and de-territorialized notions of personal rights” (1994:3).

Studying illegal immigration and guest-workers in both Europe and the United States, and with different normative concerns than those of Soysal in mind, Jacobson nonetheless seems to share with Soysal some core theoretical observations. In his

⁴An example of this deeply rooted meaning of globalization may be derived from Kellner’s (2002) comments on the events of September 11. In his *Theorizing Globalization*, Kellner suggests that terrorism elicits “policing measures to stem the flow of movements of people and goods both across borders and internally.” Kellner criticizes this state of affairs, arguing that “the U.S. Patriot Act has led to repressive measures that are replacing the spaces of the open and free information society with new forms of surveillance, policing, and repression” (2002:291). However, Kellner also seems to believe that this latest development may only be “an anomalous paroxysm” (2002:291).

Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship, Jacobson (1996) argues that the combined effect of trans-national migration and the emergence of a sweeping trans-national regime of human rights brings about the erosion of the traditional basis of nation-state membership, namely, citizenship. Under the emergent global human rights regime, he argues, the notion of “universal personhood” comes to dominate the social and political imagination. Subsequently, rights are increasingly predicated on residency rather than on citizen status, eroding the very distinction between citizen and alien and compromising the link between territorially bounded national sovereignty and citizenship.

Both Soysal and Jacobson, therefore, seem to share the view that normative or cultural globalization—here conceptualized in terms of an emergent global human rights regime—is a process that profoundly challenges the heretofore sacred notion of bounded territoriality and its bundle of associated citizenship rights. The perceived tension is thus between the trans-national (“open”) principle and the national (“close”) principle. In other words, to the extent that some states or political blocs try to halt or slow the process of conferring rights on immigrants in the name of sovereignty and social integrity, the assumed implication is that we have to theorize these attempts as running against the sweeping pressure of globalization-qua-openness. Moreover, both Soysal and Jacobson focus on noncitizens who are already residing within the borders of some affluent countries. Both theorize the ability of immigrants to create webs of ties and to induce new patterns of inclusion but do not theorize concomitant patterns of exclusion that generally, but not exclusively, apply to people outside those borders.

In contrast, the theoretical contribution I propose in this article is to conceive processes of globalization as also producing “their own,” so to speak, principles of closure. I posit that above and beyond tensions such as between national sovereignty and human rights, we are witnessing the emergence of a new cultural/normative global principle that operates as a counterbalance to the normative principle of global human rights. We are witnessing the emergence of a global mobility regime, oriented to closure and to the blocking of access, premised not only on “old” national or local grounds but on a principle of perceived universal dangerous personhoods (hereinafter referred to as “a paradigm of suspicion”). The analytical framework of this article is that the mobility regime is constructed to maintain high levels of inequality in a relatively normatively homogenized world.⁵ In practice, this means that local, national, and regional boundaries are now being rebuilt and consolidated under the increased normative pressure of, and as a counterbalance to, the universal human rights regime.

Thus, in contrast to the tendency to announce the “death of distance” (Cairncross 1997) and to declare a “mobility turn” (Urry 2003), in this article, I seek to conceptualize and theorize globalization in terms of processes of closure, entrapment, and containment. Specifically, I emphasize the extent to which processes of globalization are also concerned with the prevention of movement and the blocking of access. I posit that such processes should neither be theorized as a systemic malfunction nor as the unintended consequences of globalization. Rather, following the terminology of Simmel ([1908] 1950), I argue that the social nearness that globalization allows for is also constitutive of simultaneous processes of social distance. To wit, the technological platforms that carry all that we recognize as globalization reduce the distance

⁵I thank one of the anonymous reviewers of this article for pointing out this framework and for suggesting a lucid way for articulating it.

among people and at the same time amplify a perceived experience of dangerous social proximity between those who have and those who have not, between what is perceived as safe and familiar and that which is perceived as dangerous and contaminating (Coutin, Maurer, and Yngvesson 2002). Black directly applies this geometrical-sociology logic to terrorism, writing that “because social distance historically corresponded to physical distance, terrorism often lacked the physical geometry necessary for its occurrence: physical closeness to civilians socially distant enough to attract terrorism. New technology has made physical distance increasingly irrelevant, however, and terrorism has proliferated” (2004:14). In this article, however, I add an epistemological dimension to this perspective, emphasizing the perceived sense of threat emanating from this sociospatial dialectic. Specifically, I posit that as a result of the growing disjuncture between physical distance and social distance, globalization actually announces an unprecedented agenda of “integrated risk management” as a prominent feature of social organization. This emergent integrated risk-management system, in turn, is a central feature of the global mobility regime.

The fundamental elements of the mobility regime are analytically distinguished in this article. For this analysis to take place, the point of departure is that the differential ability to move in space—and even more so to have access to opportunities for movement—has become a major stratifying force in the global social hierarchy. The so-called mobility gap covers a wide continuum of social possibilities, stretching from the differential ability of farmers to deliver their products to nearby towns, to the differential ability to enter a corporate compound in a third-world country; from the severely restricted ability of an unemployed inner-city woman to find work and to shop, to the severely restricted ability of Pakistani citizens to visit family members in London.

The mobility gap, in and of itself, is an expression of the conditions of the possibilities of movement, such as socioeconomic factors, geographical locations, cultural imperatives, and political circumstances. However, all of these variables operate in relation to a trans-national political economy of movement. “The blatant inequality of access to mobility,” writes Bauman, “is not just the expectable, since ‘natural’, effect of income differentiation, casting the costs of transport beyond the reach of the poor. Differentiation of mobility chances is one of the few strategies avidly and consistently pursued by the governments of more affluent areas in their dealings with the population of less affluent ones” (2002:83). The epistemological, technical, and institutional expression of this political economy is that which I hereby designate as a global mobility regime. Thought of as a modality that works at local, regional, and global levels, we may thus begin to theorize the mobility regime as an important feature of globalization. A series of questions ensue. How does the mobility regime develop and how is it maintained? What are the social technologies that facilitate it? What sorts of social imageries sustain it?

In this article, I offer an exploratory sociological framework for addressing these questions. I posit that the global mobility regime is predicated, first, on the classification of individuals and groups according to principles of perceived threats and risks, and second, on an emergent technology of intervention that provides the technical/statistical means for creating elaborate forms of such social distinctions. Concretely, I posit that the engine of the contemporary mobility regime is a “paradigm of suspicion” that conflates the perceived threats of crime, immigration, and terrorism (hence the notion of “integrated risk management”), and that the technology of intervention that enables it is biosocial profiling.

In the first section of the article, I explain and describe the contours of the above-mentioned paradigm of suspicion. In the second and third sections, I introduce some of the elementary forms of the mobility regime. In the fourth and fifth sections of the article, I discuss the logic of operation characteristic of the mobility regime and elaborate on the practice of biosocial profiling. In the final section, I discuss profiling as a modality of power and distinguish it from other mechanisms of social control. I conclude by returning to Simmel's portrayal of the Stranger.

THE PARADIGM OF SUSPICION

In speaking about a paradigm of suspicion, I mean that the primary principle for determining the "license to move," both across borders and in public spaces within borders, has to do with the degree to which the agents of mobility are suspected of representing the threats of crime, undesired immigration, and terrorism, either independently or, increasingly, interchangeably. Apart from terrorism, being a newly articulated form of organized trans-national violence (Tilly 2004),⁶ the perceived threats of crime and immigration, and particularly their mutually constitutive interplay, are part of the history of modernity. The residents of the modern cities that absorbed Europe's new urban proletariat in the 19th century retained a profound mistrust of people without established connections. This mistrust has been an important engine in the increasing formal criminalization of mobility itself, from the concept of "criminal vagabondage" in France, where mobility was the crime, through a series of vagrancy panics in Britain, to increasing legal hostility to vagrants and anxiety about "crimes of mobility" in the United States (Cole 2001:9). It is also no coincidence, therefore, that early efforts to create reliable identification systems were based on the simultaneous development of police records, photographic methods, and the perfection of the passport system (Deflem 2002).

The conceptual link between immigration and social vices such as crime, disease, and moral contamination has gripped the public mind long before the present era and continually shapes immigration policies and border-control measures. Mobility is perceived as a suspicious activity especially when it relates to those without property. Immigration seekers aside, consider the policy that guides the grant of nonimmigrant visas to the United States. The standard reason for refusing to issue a visa, when such a reason is given, is that the applicant did not qualify under Section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This section is premised upon a paradigm of suspicion that stipulates that every foreigner seeking to enter the United States is considered an immigrant as long as he or she did not convince the immigration officer that at the time of the application he or she was eligible for a nonimmigrant status. To convince the immigration officer, one has to show proof of "strong ties" to the country of origin, such as a permanent job or ownership of property, in fact identical in nature to the old need to establish "settled connections."

Both the European and American media are flooded with reports and studies that link immigration and crime, often mediated through indicators of poverty. In the Netherlands, for example, reports abound about such links, citing scientific evidence that illegal immigrants are by far more likely to be involved with crime and singling

⁶In the 1970s, although terrorist groups operated internationally and struck across the globe, such did not trigger responses of the type we witness today. It is only with the development of a global imagery of trans-national entities, whether multinational corporations or terrorist organizations, that solutions are offered on this basis and coupled with other cross-border concerns.

out Moslem “culture of religious extremism” as a factor. While crime records are not kept according to ethnicity, Dutch police and government officials have publicly linked a rise in crime to immigrants, and according to criminologist Chris Rutenfrans, 63 percent of those convicted of homicide are immigrants—Moroccans, Antilleans, and sub-Saharan Africans being the chief culprits.⁷ In the United States, a senior policy analyst at the Center for Immigration Studies published a study showing that immigrants and their minor children now account for almost one in four persons living in poverty. The proportion of immigrant-headed households using at least one major welfare program is 24.5 percent compared to 16.3 percent for native households and the poverty rate for immigrants and their U.S.-born children (under 18) is two-thirds higher than that of natives and their children, 17.6 percent versus 10.6 percent (Vaughan 2004a).

Alongside the more familiar link between immigration and crime, often mediated through indicators of poverty, there also seems to emerge a new conceptual link, associating poverty with the threat of terrorism. “In the era of the War against Terror,” writes Roy, “poverty is being slyly conflated with terrorism” (2004:12). Yet, even without the mediation of poverty, the link between immigration and terrorism increasingly shapes public consciousness and public policy. Here, again, the conceptual link between immigration and terrorism may be traced to earlier similar links. At the height of the Cold War, writes Jacobson (1996), the legal category of “alien” in the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 had assumed a new meaning. Whereas prior immigration policies focused on setting numerical and ethnic-based limits on immigration, newly conceived concerns translated into a focus on the ideological profile of new entrants. Hence, the legal category of “alien” assumed an ideological association (i.e., the threat of incoming subversives) as opposed to an ethnic one (1996:48–49). In the aftermath of the September 11 attack, with the growing association of Islam with global terrorism, ideological and ethnic concerns are woven together to create an even more potent and irresistible paradigm of suspicion.

Sometimes, the link between immigration and terrorism is especially intricate. In a case involving a detained undocumented Haitian immigrant, the U.S. Department of Justice argued that although the individual in question had no links to terrorism, his release could prompt an influx of illegal Haitian refugees that, in turn, could jeopardize national security because it would have diverted immigration resources currently allocated to the fight against terrorism (Jachimowicz and McKay 2003). In general, it is argued that the immigration system plays a crucial role in the war against terrorism and that the best way to prevent the entry of terrorists into the United States is to have a well-functioning immigration system that deters, detects, and promptly removes those who lack a legitimate purpose for entering or staying in the country. However, reporting on the successes of immigration schemes such as SEVIS (a foreign students tracking system) and USVISIT (Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology, a nonimmigrant visitor tracking project) in the war on terrorism, one study revealed that achievements so far included the exposure of a smuggling ring and the discovery of 30 wanted criminals, thus illustrating the growing conflation of the perceived concerns about immigration, terrorism, and crime (Vaughan 2004b).

Explicit links between immigration from Moslem countries and terrorism are rapidly emerging. One recent report shows that the number of Middle Eastern

⁷See, for example, the December 19, 2003 electronic edition of the *Christian Science Monitor* (<http://www.csmonitor.com>) and the July 15, 2002 electronic edition of the *National Review* (<http://www.nationalreview.com>).

immigrants (including Morocco and Pakistan) in the United States has grown nearly eightfold from 1970 to 2000, reached 1.5 million people in 2000, and is expected to double again by 2010. The report stated that this growth can have “significant repercussions for our homeland security” and that the presence of a large Middle Eastern immigrant population on American soil made it easier for Islamic extremists to operate within the United States (Camarota 2002). Ethnic profiling, discussed below within the context of biosocial profiling, is thus rapidly emerging. Accordingly, Levy (2001) reports that 60 percent of Americans want Arabs to undergo more intensive screening at airports. He also reports that the Federal Motor Carrier Administration, which inspects trucks carrying hazardous materials, has announced that it “will be looking closely at the drivers, and if the person looks to be of Arab descent that would be enough” for stepped-up scrutiny. It is also on the basis of an identical logic that Israel recently introduced an amendment to its Citizenship and Entry to Israel Law, barring Palestinian spouses of Israeli citizens from entering the country on grounds that these spouses may engage in terrorist activities. Beyond studies, reports, and cover stories that shape public discourse in this direction, the conflation of the perceived threats of terror, crime, and immigration into a unitary paradigm of suspicion now routinely guides policy making, institution building, and regulation. Thus, for example, the 1998 Cairo summit of the Interpol launched a joint international policy for handling crime, immigration, and terrorism, and the United States explicitly designed its USVISIT program—regulating nonimmigrant entry to the United States—to identify travelers who violate immigration controls, have criminal records, or belong to groups listed as terrorist organizations.

Once we identify a conflated paradigm of suspicion that brings together the perceived threats of terrorism, crime, and immigration, we may appreciate the strong sociological affinity between metal detectors in American public schools and airport X-ray machines, between passports burnt with the sociobiological profile of their bearers and Interpol records of tissues and retinas, or between armed guards in restaurants, guarded gated communities, and the strengthening of immigration and border police. In all these instances, although located in different spatial settings, and although often formally established to address different types of social threats, a paradigm of suspicion is an overarching framework that sets these diverse practices in motion. In the next two sections, I therefore introduce some of the elementary forms that constitute some of the physical features of the emerging mobility regime.

ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE MOBILITY REGIME: BORDERS, FENCES, AND HYPER-GHETTOS

The first principle of division that governs the mobility regime is that which separates privileged countries and regions from most other regions of the world, in effect turning the latter into suspect countries. It is typically within these suspect countries that we find large concentrations of dispossessed groups, located in lesser regulated areas such as slums or in the more regulated confines of refugee camps. Concurrently, such countries are perceived as social spaces that have the potential of exporting criminal elements, terrorists, and undocumented immigrants into the more privileged social spaces of the globe. Thus, while the traditional function of guarded borders was conceived in terms of the need to defend sovereignty (physically against organized violent invasion and symbolically as an affirmation of national identity), the mobility potential that globalization processes facilitate simultaneously produces the

conceptualization of borders in terms of the need to protect a perceived stable and secure social fabric from unwarranted infiltration by suspect populations.

Of course, borders are not a new invention. Yet, it is noteworthy that the rational and systematic closure of national borders in general and the use of border controls to prevent immigration in particular are a modern phenomenon. Tilly (1992), theorizing the history of state-building in Europe, pays only cursory attention to borders despite the fact that control over bounded territories is inseparable from his very definition of a state. Rather than using the concept of borders, Tilly (1992) finds that rulers normally tried to establish both a secured area within which they could enjoy the returns from coercion and a fortified buffer zone to protect the secured area. However, once such buffer zones could be turned into secured areas in and of themselves, rulers initiated drives for creating newly expanded buffer zones (1992:184). Borders acquired a more significant meaning only in tandem with the consolidation of the modern national state, when governments began to “control movement across frontiers, to use tariffs and customs as instruments of economic policy, and to treat foreigners as distinctive kinds of people deserving limited rights and close surveillance” (1992:116).

However, the regime of movement in the present era is not unlike previous regimes in its primary reliance on physical barriers as means of blocking and containing mobility. These elementary practices, in turn, are based on the quite conventional methods of constructing fences. Accordingly, and in tandem with free trade agreements, an eight-foot fence stretches along the 2,000 miles border between Mexico and the United States, from Brownsville, Texas to San Diego, California. As it ends in the Pacific Ocean, between San Diego and Tihuana, the fence is 15 feet high. Hundreds of names are scribbled on the Mexican side of the fence, a kind of unofficial memorial to those killed while trying to outsmart the U.S. Operation Gatekeeper. Before it stretches a few 100 feet into the ocean, the fence also cuts across Friendship Park (Parque de la Amistad), so titled in 1971 as a gesture to the Mexican people (Nevins 2001; Andreas 2000).

Similarly, at the 2003 Tsaloniki Summit, the European Union discussed new measures for preventing entry to its territory and to consolidate what is already referred to as Fortress Europe.⁸ In recent years, Germany dramatically increased the budget of its border police and stationed on its eastern borders more police officers than the number of guards patrolling the Mexican-U.S. border. Spain built Europe’s most formidable and sophisticated system for border surveillance, relying on electronic fences, radar, and infrared cameras. And the European Union provides millions of Euros annually to countries at its periphery to enhance their border-control capacities.

A concrete fence, at times turned into barbed wire and deep trenches, also stretches between much of Israel and the Palestinian territories it occupies. At some points, it functions as a border line. At other points, it cuts right through villages and neighborhoods, sometimes encircling whole communities, sometimes isolating one or two families from the rest. Indeed, the Israeli fence is unique in that it simultaneously tries

⁸It is difficult to know the exact number of people who died while trying to enter Fortress Europe. Various sources differ in their reporting; also many deaths are by drowning and therefore unaccounted for. United for Intercultural Action, a Dutch-based European network organization that supports migrants and refugees, has documented 5,017 deaths between January 1993 and June 2004 (see its report at <http://www.united.non-profit.nl/pdfs/listofdeaths.pdf> under Refugee Campaigns at <http://www.unitedagainstracism.org>). Apart from drowning, reports in Europe collect data on deaths caused by suicides, institutional neglect, border and immigration police, death following deportation, and as a result of human trade (<http://www.carf.demon.co.uk/deaths98/table.html>).

to establish a border and to concentrate the Palestinian suspect population in highly guarded enclaves that look like a mixture of medieval ghettos and gigantic gulags (Wacquant 2004).

While the spatial confinement of Palestinians may be regarded as exceptionally harsh, mass containment of refugees, internally displaced communities, internal migrants, and impoverished populations in general is an elementary form of the mobility regime. It may be useful to think of ghetto and ethnic cluster, writes Loic Wacquant, as two ideal-type configurations at opposite ends of a continuum along which different groups are located depending on the intensity with which forces such as stigma and spatial confinement impinge upon them (Wacquant 2004).⁹ Conceived in line with these analytic criteria, many suspect countries may be analyzed as hyper-ghettos. The hyper-ghetto is, first and foremost, an extension of scale. Unlike the ghetto, which in sociological literature marks an urban setting, the hyper-ghetto refers to both urban and rural areas, at times covering an entire “sovereign” national territory to whose boundaries the population is more or less permanently confined. The hyper-ghetto is also distinct in that it may stigmatize the national population as a whole (apart from thin layers of elite and middle-class groups) as one or more ethnic clusters whose mobility must be closely guarded and, to the extent possible, restricted to the confines of the “sovereign” territory. As at least part of the population is formally allowed to move within the territorial state-container, and as the suspect state does have institutions that at least formally resemble the global model of how states “should look like” (Meyer et al. 1997), the hyper-ghetto is closer, in terms of Wacquant’s analytic terms, to the ethnic cluster end of the continuum.

However, suspect states are often also prime hosts of refugees and of increasing numbers of displaced groups who are concentrated in refugee camps and shanty towns. Refugees and internally displaced people are therefore often doubly immobilized, coerced into designated and stigmatized areas, and located at the very bottom of the social mobility hierarchy of an already suspect country. The overwhelming majority of refugees and internally displaced people reside in impoverished countries at the global periphery, as refugees typically flow in from other impoverished and war-stricken suspect countries. Asia hosts half of the world’s refugees, Africa 22 percent, Europe 21 percent, and 10 percent are located in South and North America. Among the leading host countries of refugees in the world are Pakistan, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Armenia. Iran was until recently the world’s number one host of refugees, hosting nearly 2 million Afghan people.¹⁰ Moreover, the population of suspect countries as a whole tends to be located at the lower end of the mobility gap. In general, its mobility constraints reflect lack of access to the resources required for mobility (e.g., money, information, and travel documents) and, moreover, this population often serves as a source of cheap labor, directly and indirectly catering to the needs of multinational corporations. From this perspective, the hyper-ghettos of suspect countries look closer, in terms of Wacquant’s analytic terms, to the ghetto end of the continuum.

⁹In general, Wacquant (2004) offers four criteria for articulating the sociological analytical concept of the ghetto. The ghetto is treated as an urban space subjected to forces of stigma, constraint, spatial confinement, and institutional duplication.

¹⁰See *UNHCR 2003 Global Refugee Trends* at <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home>. The report refers to over 20 million mobility-challenged people, of whom 51 percent are refugees, 5 percent seek political asylum, 12 percent are deported immigrants, and 28 percent are internally displaced. Also see accounts and personal interviews in *Human Rights Watch Annual Report 2002 on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons* at <http://www.hrw.org>.

Typically, most attention has been given to the increasing difficulties of residents of suspect countries to obtain immigration permits and political asylum. Yet not less indicative for sorting out the elementary forms of the mobility regime, when it comes to the effective constitution of stigmatized suspect countries and stigmatized suspect populations, is the fact that the ability to leave them is increasingly difficult for nonimmigrants as well. Holding a Turkish or a Russian or a Nigerian passport does not so much indicate one's identity as a bearer of rights as much as it marks one as a potential unwanted immigrant. Accordingly, the mobility regime is increasingly based on limiting the travel opportunities of such citizens en masse, putting enormous difficulties on the ability to get ordinary tourist visas, often using basic tactics such as long waits, high application fees, and a variety of bureaucratic hurdles.¹¹

ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE MOBILITY REGIME: QUARANTINES AND GATED COMMUNITIES

The mobility regime also operates within the perimeters of privileged localities, countries, and economic and political blocs. It is useful to distinguish between those elementary forms that work through the prevention of exit (e.g., prisons) and those elementary forms that work through the prevention of entry (e.g., gated communities). While these two forms of social isolation address and manage different social strata, and while they operate on the basis of almost diametrically opposite logics, they may be sociologically located along a continuum of practices designed to consolidate a mobility regime in general and to strategically distance suspect social elements in particular. Indeed, while there are strong sociological reasons not to collapse such distinct phenomena as prisons and gated communities into a single category, there are also other sociological reasons to treat them both as products of distinct strategies of group power; in the former case, the power of dominant groups to stigmatize, isolate, and immobilize suspect groups by controlling their exit rights, and in the latter case, the power of dominant groups to isolate themselves from suspect groups by controlling their rights of entry into certain designated social spaces. Specifically, we may thus see the integrated risk-management system of the mobility regime as predicated upon two pillars: segregating suspect social elements in prisons, urban ghettos, and quarantines on the one hand, and sheltering privileged groups in gated communities, secured work places, and guarded shopping malls on the other (Davis 1990).

In this section, the concept of quarantines refers to multiple forms of containment and imprisonment. Quarantine, in general, operates by identifying and distancing people perceived as dangerous by subjecting them to particular treatment protocols. Foucault (1980)—while not specifically discussing a mobility regime— theorized the development of modern governance in relation to various forms of quarantine. Medieval cities, wrote Foucault, already relied on two types of measures to deal with perceived threats such as leprosy and plague: exclusion and quarantine (Curtis 2002). Urban authorities in later times, pressured by the bourgeoisie, dealt with the politicosanitary menace by perfecting the instrument of quarantine. Yet what started

¹¹British families of Asian decent, for example, complain that their family members in Asia encounter growing difficulties in obtaining permission to visit them in the United Kingdom. Indeed, there was a dramatic increase in the British rate of refusal for nonimmigrant visa applicants in 2002: in India, the rate of refusal climbed from 29 to 59 percent, in Bangladesh it reached 85 percent, in Iran it tripled, and the rate of refusal for Russian citizens increased by 124 percent compared to the previous year. See Jenny Bourn, "Step Up in Family Visitor Visa Denial," November 27, 2003, *Independent Race and Refugee News Network*, available at <http://www.irr.org.uk/2003/november/ha000016.html>.

as urban politics of health later converged with other forms of containment to become an important element of modern “governmentality” (Foucault 1991, 1980).

Also on the privileged side of border fences, the mobility regime still relies on the old methods of using prisons, penitentiaries, detention camps, and a host of other types of quarantines to isolate social elements perceived to be dangerous. With the world’s largest prison population, the United States imprisons at a far greater rate than both rich and many impoverished and authoritarian countries. On a per capita basis, the United States has three times more prisoners than Iran, four times more than Poland, five times more than Tanzania, and seven times more than Germany¹² (Garland 2001; Wacquant 2001). Affirming a no-compromise approach to jailing, as well as a conceptual fusion between immigration and terrorism, the U.S. Department of Justice also announced that undocumented immigrants could be detained indefinitely, without bond, if the government provided evidence that their release might threaten national security.

To inhibit, contain, and control unauthorized immigration, countries such as the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Australia created large detention camps for asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants. In recent years, changing geopolitics and numerous national crises led to dramatic increases in the number of people seeking asylum in Europe. Whereas in 1987, 57,400 individuals applied for asylum in Germany alone, between 1988 and 1992 a total of 1.1 million asylum applications were lodged. A peak was reached in 1992, when nearly 440,000 asylum seekers filed applications. In the much smaller Netherlands, there were 43,900 asylum requests in 2000, mostly submitted by citizens of the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.¹³ In the United Kingdom, private contractors run sites such as the Oakington Detention Centre for asylum seekers and the Campsfield Prison for refugees, holding a few hundred detainees at a time. On the other side of the English Channel, the Red-Cross-run Sangatte refugee camp near the Eurotunnel transport terminal in Calais accommodates more than 1,500 asylum seekers, most of them Afghans and Kurds. Australia has put in place a mandatory detention policy for asylum seekers who arrive without entry visas, many of them by boat from countries such as Indonesia. The detainees are held in sites such as the Womera camp, where thousands are detained in the Australian desert. All across Europe, detention camps and prisons also serve as a transit port for undocumented immigrants targeted for deportation. The current deportation rate from Europe is 350,000 people annually, in addition to another 150,000 people who participate in various European “voluntary” programs of return. These deportees sooner or later join the immobilized suspect populations who inhabit the hyper-ghettoes in suspect countries.¹⁴

Not least important, if less visibly harsh in its consequences, is the way privileged populations shield themselves against risks by using methods of self-enclosure. Self-enclosure has become an intensive process in poor and rich countries alike, involving a host of market entities specializing in providing the needed equipment, personnel, and infrastructure. Multinational corporations doing business in impoverished countries are leaders in this art. Consider the following description of ChevronTexaco’s compound in Angola: “Built in the 1960s, Malongo is a campus of ranch houses,

¹²“U.S. Prison Population Largest in the World,” *Baltimore Sun*, June 1, 2003, citing Bruce Western, a sociologist at Princeton University; see http://www.charleston.net/stories/060103/wor_01jailbirds.shtml.

¹³Source: <http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?id=123>.

¹⁴The European Union allocates 250 million Euros annually for deporting unwanted newcomers. The budget currently includes the cost of leasing airplanes, because regular commercial airlines, under public protest, are increasingly reluctant to transport deportees.

manicured green lawns and smooth paved roads. ChevronTexaco's own well and private filtration system supplies drinkable tap water—a rare luxury in Africa. Spacious dining halls offer a stunning array of fresh seafood, imported meats, salad and dessert bars. The vegetables are all grown in an organic greenhouse on the compound, set up by Norwegians, and bright green Granny Smith apples are flown in from South Africa . . . ChevronTexaco does everything it can to keep it that way. No one enters or leaves the compound without special permission. And there's no way to avoid the tightly guarded security gates, because the entire compound is surrounded by a double fence of barbed wire that encloses a ring of anti-personnel land mines" (Eviatar 2004:13).

Whether we consider policies and practices that are based on the logic of defense against the threat of terrorism, the threat of immigration, or the threat of crime, the sociological common denominator is a dramatic social effort to perfect mechanisms of self-enclosure. Those in Brazil who can afford it spend \$4.5 billion annually on private security. The proportion between the number of private security guards and the Brazilian police is 3:1, and private policing has become one of the most prosperous activities in Brazil in recent years (Beato 2003). In South Africa, the annual spending on private home security is \$1.3 billion, tripling the governmental annual spending on public housing (Masuku 2003).

Spreading fast is that residential spatial arrangement known as the gated community. Blakely and Snyder (1997), documenting the proliferation of gated communities in the United States, estimate that as many as 8 million Americans live in as many as 20,000 gated communities, often citing fear of crime as the reason behind gating. In a sense, the gated community is a microcosm of the global mobility regime, predicated as it is on a combination of governmental and market forces. While governments contract with construction companies to build fences and border barriers, private security firms sell private police forces, armed vehicles, cameras, sensors, alarm systems, and fences that surround whole middle-class and even working-class communities (Salcedo and Torres 2004; Low 2003).

In many U.S. schools, metal detectors screen all boys and girls who come in, while armed guards ensure that no student will escape the compound during the school day. North-American inner-city schools, already located within distinct boundaries deemed dangerous to cross use technological surveillance, security personnel, metal detectors, and paramilitary control tactics to maintain order and safety (Devine 1996). In affluent urban areas, on the other hand, shopping malls are restricted zones designated to accommodate only certain classes of consumers (Crawford 1992). Thus, the guards of one strictly gated mall in Rhode Island, for example, bar the entry of people who wear T-shirts that bear what the guards consider to be inappropriate language. Visitors who form groups of more than five people are subjected to deportation back to the street. All in all, self-enclosure thus denotes not only a relentless process of privatizing the public sphere but also a not less relentless process of "militarizing" it, subjecting it to a highly regulated mobility regime (Davis 1990).

THE OSMOTIC PROPERTIES OF THE MOBILITY REGIME

The deployment of the mobility regime, precisely because it must facilitate global cross-border flows, depends upon the creation of screening mechanisms. Thought of in spatial terms, globalization is a process constitutive of a global mobility regime that aspires to screen those substances (viruses, people, and hazardous materials) that may

cross the boundaries of some designated social containers (e.g., national borders and gated communities) from those that may not. In the present era, writes Bauman, “the state tends to be reduced to the status of an enlarged and ennobled police precinct,” whose function is “to guard the selectivity of osmosis” (2002:82). Again not unlike the elementary forms discussed above, there is nothing substantively new about the regulation of movement through the creation of osmotic mechanisms. Practices of enclosure, even in extreme cases of sealed total institutions, must always rely on some selection procedures that distinguish that which may come across from that which cannot.

During the feudal era, most people could not leave their communities without written consent, and those who did risked imprisonment and death. Feudal estates closely watched their boundaries, deriving revenue from fees of passage and multitude types of tariffs and excise duties. In the 18th century, with the birth of the modern bureaucratic sovereign state, the regulation of movement reached new levels of precision. From then on, governments increasingly saw it as their business to generate and archive knowledge about individuals and ordinary people, among other things, to regulate mobility. Primary among the measures developed for facilitating an osmotic regime of movement had been the introduction of passports, first in France in 1792 and soon after in many other European countries. Passports, also needed for domestic travel, came coupled with regulation designed to control vagrancy, crime, and foreign infiltration, thus turning the 19th century into a hotbed for developing the paradigm of the modern mobility regime (Cole 2001; Torpey 2000).

The current global mobility regime, writes Bauman, is based on a distinctive principle of osmosis: “traveling for profit is encouraged; traveling for survival is condemned” (2002:84). To maintain this osmotic system, new technologies of social intervention are developed and perfected in tandem with the physical development of fences, prisons, and gated enclaves. One instance of this osmotic fine-tuning concerns infinite administrative classificatory expansion. A basic illustration of this is the classificatory scheme of American nonimmigrant visas. As of 2004, there have been 48 different categories of nonimmigrant visas to the United States. Thus, for example, the H-2A type of nonimmigrant visa is applicable to “temporary agricultural workers coming to the United States to fill positions for which a temporary shortage of American workers has been recognized by the U.S. Department of Agriculture,” while the L-1 type of nonimmigrant visa is applicable to “intracompany transferees who work in positions as managers, executives or persons with specialized knowledge.” Thus, classes of people who are typically barred entry, namely, unskilled laborers, may be granted mobility rights for designated tasks, while people who become valuable citizens of multinational corporations, namely, corporate executives, are granted special mobility privileges. In both cases, the visa system allows for the fine-tuning of movement, carefully sorting out individual identities. In particular, the osmotic system is now geared toward sorting out those who are deemed necessary to enhance the quality of the labor market from those who are considered redundant or, worse, a burden. Thus, the continued mobility of high-skilled workers is considered a vital issue for many rich countries. Accordingly, around 1.1 million people considered high skilled came to work in the United States in 2000 on temporary stay visas, more than the roughly 850,000 immigrants admitted for legal permanent residence (Jachimowicz and Meyers 2002). Similarly, Germany introduced a “green card” system to help satisfy the demand for highly-qualified information technology experts. Through this new immigration program, about 9,200 highly-skilled workers have entered Germany through August 2001, with 1,935 Indians accounting for the largest

group (<http://www.migrationinformation.org>). At the same time, millions are barred entry, whether as immigrants or visitors, on various grounds of perceived threats. In sum, the osmotic system developed under the guidelines of the global mobility regime must rely not simply on fences but on finely-tuned screening mechanisms that provide it with its necessary social elasticity. Screening, in turn, relies on that technology of intervention that I designate as biosocial profiling.

PROFILING: BEYOND LAW AND DISCIPLINE

Profiling, and specifically racial and ethnic profiling, attracts significant attention from sociologists, public policymakers, and legal experts.¹⁵ In the United States, racial profiling commonly refers to any police-initiated action that relies on race, ethnicity, or national origin rather than on particular individual behavior as criteria for selecting whom to stop or arrest (Ramirez, McDevitt, and Farrell 2000). Here, I would like to expand the notion of profiling to cover a whole range of practices aimed at both one's physical and social identity that are undertaken by a host of mobility regime market and governmental agents. I treat profiling and more precisely, biosocial profiling, as an emergent technology of social intervention that objectifies whole strata of people by assigning them into suspect categories, thereby enabling the paradigm of suspicion to be translated into elaborate practices of containment. In contrast to the modality of law, which punishes and locks away through a binary guilty/innocent distinction, and in contrast to the modality of the disciplines, which corrects behavior and occasionally quarantines through bell-curve matrices of normalization (Hunt 1992; Foucault 1977), profiling predicts behavior and regulates mobility by situating subjects in categories of risk.

Now two qualifications of the above formulation must be immediately introduced. First, laws and disciplines are not substituted for profiling. Legal regulation and disciplinary procedures are widely applied and certainly play a central role in facilitating imprisonments, deportations, and a host of other types of containment. Rather, it would be more accurate to say that profiling emerges as a more discrete technology of intervention that facilitates and complements the regulation of mobility by legal and disciplinary means. Moreover, while laws and regulations may formally enable governance through profiling, they nonetheless lack the instruments and the type of gaze that allows profiling to function as a mode of spatial containment that is able—on the ground—to maintain the selectivity of boundary-crossing and to effectively distinguish those who are licensed to move from those who are not.

Second, profiling does not operate exclusively at the service of the mobility regime, nor is it a technology specifically designed to contain mobility. Profiling is also widely used as a technology for screening, hiring, and controlling employees, as a technology for the monitoring and channeling of consumption, as a technology for establishing insurance premiums, and as a technology of sentencing. In these latter functions, profiling works through actuarial practices: techniques that “use statistics to represent the distribution of variables in a population,” treat individuals “as locations in actuarial tables of variation,” and seek to predict behavior and situate subjects “according to the risk they pose” (Simon 1988:771–72). Indeed, profiling—in its

¹⁵For example, the 2002 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association devoted a special plenary to discuss racial profiling and offered attendees a short course about racial profiling and organizations. A special issue on “Ethnic and Racial Profiling” is also forthcoming in the *Canadian Journal of Law and Society* (Vol. 18(3), 2004).

actuarial manifestation—has long been used by insurance companies as a risk-management strategy for evaluating the monetary threat different categories of individuals posed for insurers (thus young drivers pay higher premiums than veteran drivers, reflecting statistics showing that they are more vulnerable to traffic accidents). Actuarial practices also migrated from the insurance market and began to shape criminal sentencing. The logic of risk management has become a central theme of criminal justice policy and a new paradigm of “actuarial justice”—namely, the management of crime opportunities and risk distribution rather than the management of individual offenders—now drives and shapes sentencing policies (Kemshall 2003; Feeley and Simon 1992). In recent years, profiling has not simply become a major technique of screening and licensing but has emerged as a constitutive feature of the entire mobility regime. Absorbing and internalizing the methods developed by both market entities and state policing apparatuses, the profiling of the mobility regime represents a fusion between insurance-oriented risk-management strategies and a criminal-justice-oriented sentencing paradigm. In the process, profiling shifted from being a method for assigning specific individuals into various categories of risk into an all-encompassing method that targets society as a whole and treats mobility per se as a suspect practice. In this sense, as Agamben (2004) aptly observed, humanity itself has become a dangerous class.

As a global technology that creates social barriers by designating a status of suspects to an ever-growing number of individuals, biosocial profiling is concerned with establishing degrees of threat and corresponding rated rights of movement. Profiling is therefore the technology of intervention that underwrites the possibility of maintaining the global osmotic system. It works by assigning individuals into an ever-expanding list of suspect categories, each based on intricate internal sublevels of suspicion, and each cross-examined in relation to other categories. Accordingly, profiling is based on endless series of observations, data gathering, and classificatory procedures that allow for the creation of highly complex profiling models. In general, profiling is based on the creation and inscription of a holistic personal profile into electronic databases in ways that allow the classification of individuals into various categories of suspicion. It operates at two analytically distinct levels that are coupled and subsequently jointly inscribed. At one level, profiling is based on the systematic (“actuarial”) collection of demographic, ethnic, and socioeconomic data. At another level, profiling is based on the collection of data that directly refers to the individual body, such as color of skin, facial characteristics, tissues, irises, fingerprints, and DNA. Combined, these collections converge into an identity that is, “outside the physical body, in the files and paper records of some government bureaucracy” (Cole 2001:10) to a degree unimaginable by previous generations.

As an operational technology, profiling is interchangeably formal, quasi-formal, and informal. At times, it is executed through unmediated human contact. Such is the case when the category of DWB (Driving While Black) is intuitively produced as a category of suspicion that licenses a potentially violent arrest. This display of “mundane” racial profiling is extremely important, as it becomes an intuitive routine of everyday life. Thus, analyzing the work of insurance underwriters, Glenn challenges the “myth of the actuary,” namely, the “general belief that insurance practices are predicated on objective statistics” (2003:132, 2000). The insurance underwriter, writes Glenn, does not simply and scientifically compare “applicants to a matrix, and if they fit into it they are accepted” (2003:133). Rather, many property/casualty insurance companies perform what is called “character underwriting,” which is a holistic assessment of the applicant as having a “mature, stable, and responsible”

character. In the 19th century, writes Glenn, immigrants were considered a risk because their character traits were “indefinite, incapable of analysis, separation, or estimation” and, as a result, entire categories of individuals were excluded on the basis of race or nationality (2003:133). In present times, writes Glenn, insurance agents complement formal actuary practices with a “risk report” that includes observations on issues such as an excessive number of liquor bottles spotted in the house, unusual hobbies, or other evidence of an unconventional lifestyle. In fact, such profiling is performed in one way or another each time we enter a guarded restaurant, let alone when we answer the inquiries of security “selectors” at airports. In this latter case, profiling is based on a series of questions that are carefully designed—based on preexisting models of risk with which such “selectors” are equipped—to determine one’s suspicion rating and hence one’s freedom to board a plane or to cross a border. Similarly, consular officers and immigration police officers are trained in the art of interviewing, believed to provide essential personal data that formal questionnaires fail to capture. The interview, then, becomes a vital profiling technique, as much as the test is a vital disciplinary method.

Profiling also benefits from information sharing between governmental and market entities. Profiling serves credit companies, banks, and insurance companies to determine the risks and threats that individuals represent to their normal commercial operations. Profiling technologies that are developed in the market for commercial purposes allow for unprecedented projects of detecting and regulating mobility. Such projects are based on the perfection of databases that facilitate a close watch over the movements of individuals as they are tracked and recorded by the use of cellular phones, credit cards, and Internet-based consumption. Both governments and market players, therefore, contribute to the transformation of the public sphere into an arena of surveillance and screening, thereby enabling the osmotic mobility regime of the present era. Thus, for example, European leaders agreed in March 2004 on a range of security measures, including monitoring data from mobile phone calls, a practice that inevitably implicates private phone companies in the overall monitoring scheme. To the extent that many of the immobilized and spatially contained populations of the world do not have access to digital devices such as credit cards and cellular phones, this very lack may suffice for high-risk classification in the profiling matrix.

Profiling, the higher we climb the institutional ladder, refers not only to dress, accent, and color of skin, not even solely to religious, ethnic, or national identity (although these are of course critical), but rather to a dense web of biological, demographic, consumerist, and economic data.¹⁶ When it comes to attempts to acquire a visa and to cross borders, profiling is becoming particularly penetrating and is increasingly based on technologies of examination that are by far more sophisticated than the impressionist judgments of police officers and security guards. Thus, for example, the 1998 Cairo summit of the Interpol created a new unit whose mandate is “to provide strategic and technical support to enhance member states’ DNA profiling capacity and to promote its widespread use in the international law enforcement environment.” Following post-September 11 regulations, most of those who enter the United States are face-scanned and fingerprinted prior to entry under the provisions of the USVISIT program. The program is designed to expand both profiling capabilities and detection possibilities by enhancing spatial monitoring

¹⁶For example, immigrants arriving in the United States may be subjected—beyond interviews, biometric tests, and inspection of documents—to detention for physical and mental examination under Section 232 of the Code of Federal Regulations issued by the Department of Homeland Security (8 U.S.C. §1252).

beyond the port of entry. It mandates information sharing among mobility regime agencies such as the Bureau of Immigration and Custom's Enforcement (ICE), the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), and the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS). Also, the data generated by USVISIT are designed to assist the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in generating and updating social categories of suspicion. The European Union as well, along with its decision to establish a joint border police by 2005, decided upon a joint visa system that will enable detection and information sharing through an electronic system that would burn biometric data of visa applicants onto their passports. European countries also prepare to issue new passports, burnt with biometric data such as fingerprints and iris patterns.

Bioprofiling, however, is not simply a more accurate and efficient way to validate one's identity and to cross it with relevant data on illegal immigration, crime, or terrorism. Bioprofiling inscribes a designated category of suspicion on human bodies, facilitating a situation in which one's fingerprints testify to one's travel log and consumption patterns along with one's place of origin, ethnic background, or religious affiliation. In this way, biosocial profiling transforms mobility into a public performance, both in the sense of treating the human individual as a mobile unit located within collective categories of suspicion and in the sense of subjecting a relatively discreet social action to public scrutiny. Perhaps ironically, however, the transformation of mobility into a moment of utmost exposure does not enhance social proximity but rather maintains and facilitates a regime of social distance.

Profiling represents a distinct modality of power, in this case the power to immobilize, to create social distances, and in general to police and regulate spatial behavior. Profiling has to be distinguished from other modalities of power. Foucault characterized late modernity by arguing that an intricate web of nonegalitarian distinctions—enabled by technologies of normalization—underwrites the package of egalitarian and universal rights promised to individuals in liberal constitutions. Normalization, as Foucault called it, announced an era of lesser reliance on physical punishment in general and on the life-taking powers of law in particular. Rather, normalization uses disciplinary techniques that manage life by subjecting individuals to an ever-expanding list of standards to which they are expected to conform. Perceiving people as “moral and rational actors” (Simon 1988), normalization aspires to “change” people and to correct behavior. In guiding sentencing policies, write Feeley and Simon (1992), this meant concerns with rehabilitation and reform. However, the new penology, they argue, relies on actuarial techniques rather than individual characteristics to determine punishment, aiming more at efficient risk management than at rehabilitation (Feeley and Simon 1994, 1992). Because this actuarial justice does not seek to change people but rather “to manage them in place” (Simon 1988:773), its logic seems to be in perfect fit with the mobility-curbing and mobility-confining tasks of biosocial profiling as well. Biosocial profiling, activated at the service of a mobility regime, is not concerned with correction (whether through education, persuasion, or sanctions), but rather with fixing individuals into given categories of suspicion. If various tests serve the disciplines in their attempt to normalize individual behavior, then the classifications of profiling serve the mobility regime in its attempt to block or contain individuals. Thus, paraphrasing Foucault, we may argue that a dense web of nonegalitarian distinctions—establishing a system of highly differential movement licenses—underwrites the universal declarations of human rights that are so strongly associated with globalization.

CONCLUSION

Globalization has been intensively theorized in terms of cross-border flows connoting imageries of openness. Of specific interest to this article has been the way that issues such as citizenship and personhood-based entitlements have been theorized in terms of the diminishing or eroding capacities of states to confer rights on the basis of sovereignty and in terms of the ascent of global principles of human rights as a newly found basis of trans-national governance (eliciting certain perceptions about the normative dimension of globalization as well as concrete organized social action such as humanitarian intervention). In this article, I suggested that globalization is overtheorized in terms of social openness and undertheorized in terms of social closure. I further argued that the normative dimension of globalization should be theorized not only in terms of the ascent of the global principle of universal human rights and its impact on individual and collective entitlements but also in terms of another ascending principle, namely, a global mobility regime that works in the opposite direction, limiting and preventing access to certain rights and entitlements through the regulation of social space (relying not only on individual states but also on multistate cooperation, regional blocs, and international organizations).

I argued that the regulation of movement that evolves under the new cultural and normative conditions brought about by globalization is predicated on a paradigm of suspicion, one that constructs individuals and often whole social groups as having suspect identities related to the risks of immigration, crime, and terrorism. I suggested that immigration, crime, and terrorism, each on its own account and often coupled with one another, have been more or less intensely conceived as social problems throughout the 20th century. Hence, the “newness” in speaking about a paradigm of suspicion does not lie at the level of absence or presence of historical precedents. Rather, the newness lies in the normative and structural global conditions that turn the paradigm of suspicion into a potent cultural force in the regulation of movement. First, cross-border movements are not only coupled with both crime and terrorism, but crime and terrorism are also conceived in terms of trans-national activities on their own account. Second, it is only in recent years that a technology of social screening has fully ripened, allowing for new forms of risk management that are geared toward “fixing” people in their place. And third, arguably above all, the mobility regime is theorized as a global principle precisely because it represents a structural response to the problem of maintaining high levels of inequality in a relatively normatively homogenized world. In this sense, the already familiar legal and constitutional debates concerning the adequate balance between human rights and, say, national security, are not mere replications of the tension between the global and the local. Rather, they should be understood as increasingly representing the tension between universal rights and universal fears, both operating at the global level, albeit materializing at concrete localities.

In his classic article on the Stranger, Georg Simmel argued that the unity of nearness and remoteness involved in every human relation is organized, in the phenomenon of the stranger, in a way that makes the one who is close by to be perceived as far, and the one who is perceived to be far, to be perceived as actually near ([1908] 1950). Globalization, among other things, means that we now fully live in such a society of strangers. However, Simmel treated the sociological phenomenon of the Stranger not simply as a specific form of interaction but also as “a very positive relation” (1950:402). For Simmel, the Stranger represented and embodied a freedom of mobility unavailable to others, thus allowing for novel forms of what he called

social participation. In this article, I tried to show that under a newly articulated paradigm of suspicion, new forms of social participation and association are conditioned by the emergence of a mobility regime that aims at curbing the movement of strangers precisely at a historical moment when it is becoming harder to establish who is a stranger. The “stranger,” in this sense, has become the one who is constituted as a suspect, facing an expansive set of physical, psychological, and sociological fences, a subject of a mobility regime that operates not only through visible presence on borders and the policing of bounded spaces but also through multilayered gestures of closure that operate at the most minute aspects of social interaction. The stranger is now fully recognized, simultaneously as a universal rights-bearer and a universal threat.

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