Freedom as Mobility: Implications of the Distinction between Actual and Potential Travelling

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ABSTRACT  This paper defines mobility as the potential transport of humans and explores the mobility aspect of freedom. Freedom as mobility is composed both of opportunities to travel when and where one pleases and of the feasibility of the choice not to travel. The essay further analyses the implications for the idea of freedom as mobility of distinguishing between actual and potential travel. It is also shown how mobility as a right is challenged by a central feature of democracy – namely, respect for unanimity – and how tracks left by travellers can be exploited for surveillance and control. Moreover, mobility leads to a potential absence and thus uncertainty. The paper evaluates how alternative responses to this problem have widely different consequences for the experience of freedom as mobility.

KEY WORDS: freedom, mobility, motility, liberal paradox, mobility rights, surveillance

Modern conceptions of the self … have profoundly been about the mattering of mobility – of freedoms conceived in terms of a complicated conjunction of social and physical bodies in space and in motion. (Hay & Packer, 2004, pp. 212–213)

Introduction

The link between mobility, freedom, and rights has long been recognised and well established. The first paragraph of Article 13 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 declares that ‘everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state’. The idea of mobility as a right is consistently found in important policy documents, such as the policy guidelines of the European Union’s White Paper on European transport...
policy, which state: ‘Personal mobility, which increased from 17 km a day in 1970 to 35 km in 1998, is now more or less seen as an acquired right’ (European Commission, 2001, p.11). The connection between freedom and mobility is easily seen, as high mobility implies many opportunities to travel, which in turn is a prerequisite for self-decision regarding what activities to participate in (Houseman, 1979).

The purpose of this essay is to analyse and problematise the relationship between mobility and freedom. The association between the libertarian idea of freedom as self-determination and mobility as potential transport is examined. Self-determination is here the right or opportunity of individuals to make choices so as to be in charge of their own fates. The notions of freedom and mobility are both complex, and only a few tensions and dilemmas, mostly related to the distinction between actual and potential travelling, are discussed here. Are there implications of excessive movement that make it problematic to see freedom as mobility?

Enormous sums of money are spent on the improvement of mobility. The budgets are backed by a political rhetoric giving prominence to efficiency gains and the value of free movement. Yet travellers may curtail each others’ freedom by causing mutual delays, by letting the hegemony of auto-mobility erode the feasibility of low-mobility lifestyles, and by control and intrusive protection devices. It is important to impart nuances to the mainstream political rhetoric by discussing and problematising the idea of promoting freedom by heightening the level of personal mobility. The aim is to increase awareness of the fact that attempts to achieve freedom by more mobility should take into account some consequences of excessive travel that tend to have the opposite effect of what is intended. The essay pursues this aim by arguing that: the advantages meant to follow from higher mobility are not necessarily realised with rapidly increasing transport; mobility rights, like other rights, have to be balanced against democratic aims and are problematic in principle; tracks left by people on the move open up opportunities for surveillance thus offsetting the freedom gains of being mobile; and uncertainties created by absence are often countered by strategies seriously impeding the freedom associated with the mobility causing the absence. The following paragraphs on ‘mobility’ and ‘freedom’ give some definitions and important categorisations.

**Mobility**

Leaving out the sociological meanings of social mobility and residential mobility, the notion of mobility is still wide ranging. Mobility is defined as the ease of movement, and can refer to the movement of individuals, goods, capital, and information in the form of text, other signs, or images. However, this essay deals with mobility of people in geographical space. The main definitional question is then whether mobility should be seen as potential or revealed action; that is, opportunities for travel or the trips actually taken. Mobility is here conceptualised as potential transport and seen as the capacity of an individual to overcome physical distance (Sager, 2005). Potential travel is denoted ‘motility’ by Kaufmann (2002, pp.1, 43), who also prefers ‘observable travel’ to the term ‘revealed travel’ (ibid., p.43). People might have preferences for potential transport considerably beyond the trips they actually demand. Kaufmann points out that a high level of potential transport might be regarded as a sort of insurance. It gives the security of not being caught
unaware and sedentary when something unanticipated happens (Kaufmann, 2002, p.72).

It is unlikely that high mobility in a population can be upheld unless revealed transport is also at a high level. Transport supply is costly and will be cut back if it is not demonstrably appreciated. However, too high a demand can also cause problems. The demand for trips might exceed infrastructure capacity, so that travellers delay each other or exclude others from travelling. Demand that is higher than the capacity thus reduces mobility. The crux of the matter is that a sufficient share of the population in the catchment area of each supplied mode of travel actually has to use the mode in order to maintain high mobility for everybody, but the market still has to be cleared within capacity constraints.

Mobility is thus closely related to potential and actual movement, where the movement must occur in or refer to some kind of space. No matter what type of space is imagined, mobility is created by overcoming friction measured as physical distance, costs, or other variables indicating inertia or resistance. The defeat of friction might be associated with more freedom in the sense of an expanded set of available opportunities, as friction is seen as a constraint that is relaxed. A higher level of mobility might correspond to a higher level of the aspect of freedom peculiar to the type of space in question.

Freedom

In line with the stated purpose of the essay, the following paragraphs deal with the libertarian concept of freedom, meaning that republican and idealist ideas are ignored (Miller, 2006, pp.2–4). While the scholarly literature on freedom is immense, the aim of this section is simply to introduce two related distinctions – namely, negative and positive freedom, and the opportunity aspect and process aspect of freedom. These dichotomies help to understand and characterise the aspects of freedom analysed in the ensuing sections, namely:

- Autonomy (resistance, the forced-to-be-free problem).
- Freedom as having opportunities and choice (the freedom not to travel).
- Rights (social exclusion).
- Surveillance (control, disciplining).

Selecting a few freedom-related notions to shed light on the phenomenon of mobility is warranted, as ‘[f]reedom has many distinct aspects, and there is little prospect of obtaining one real-valued index of freedom that will capture all the aspects adequately’ (Sen, 2002a, p.506).

A main analytic distinction is made between negative freedom and positive freedom (Berlin, 1969; Silier, 2005). There is negative freedom when people are obeying non-interference constraints, suggesting that the individual enjoys protection from encroachment. The negative view of freedom focuses on the absence of restraints that one person may exercise over another, or the state may exercise over individuals. This facet of freedom is linked to freedom of choice and also to rights, in that people should not be prevented by others from doing what they have a right to do. Pritchard (2000, pp.49–50) cites Thomas Hobbes to show that the
reflexivity of freedom and mobility has long been associated with the idea of negative freedom:

Liberty, that we may define it, is nothing else but an absence of the lets and hindrances of motion … [E]very man hath more or less liberty, as he hath more or less space in which he employs himself … [T]he more ways a man may move himself, the more liberty he hath. (Hobbes, 1949, pp.109–110)

Positive freedom, on the other hand, is not freedom from, but rather freedom to. It refers to the power a person has to realise a desired state of affairs, concentrating on what he/she can choose to do or achieve. In economics, positive freedom is often measured as the set of alternative commodity bundles over which a person can establish command. However, it is doubtful that command over commodities gives the best indication of freedom, as commodities (and primary goods) are means to ends. If the positive conception of freedom is to reflect a person’s ability to achieve intrinsically valuable capabilities and well-being, then there is a case for viewing this freedom in terms of alternative bundles of ‘functionings’ that a person may be able to achieve (e.g. being well nourished, being able to appear in public without shame, being able to move about in geographical space). Accordingly, Sen (1999) has developed a ‘capability approach’ to positive freedom, where the possibility to choose between alternative sets of capabilities to do this or be that reflects a person’s advantage, his or her capability to function.

Sen (2002a) distinguishes the opportunity aspect from the process aspect of freedom. The first aspect concerns our more or less unconstrained pursuit of substantive opportunities, our actual capability to achieve our objectives, to accomplish things that we have reason to value. Constraints weakening negative freedom can eliminate substantive opportunities. The opportunity aspect is nevertheless related to the positive view of freedom and to the libertarian theory of freedom as having choice alternatives. The valuing of opportunities corresponds with the desire for mobility in the sense of potential transport.

The process aspect of freedom is about having the levers of control in one’s own hands. It concerns the procedures, rules, conventions, and so forth, guiding and controlling our lives. The crucial issue is ‘whether the choices are being made by the person herself – not (on her behalf) by other individuals or institutions’ (Sen, 2002a, p.508). Hence, the process aspect of freedom is associated with the autonomy of decision (self-determination) and with immunity from interference by others, with the first feature depending on the second. The libertarian conception of rights, as outlined by Nozick (1974), relates closely to what was called negative freedom above and incorporates the autonomy and immunity facets of Sen’s process aspect of freedom. Rights might concern both opportunities and process, however. Rights pertaining to mobility can therefore be about the choice of staying or moving, but also about procedures preventing unduly control or surveillance of travellers.

Freedom is valued both as an instrument and because it has intrinsic value, and the next section makes use of this distinction in a mobility context. An important instrumentalist argument is that uncertainty about our own preferences makes it useful to have more options. Intrinsic value might be attributed to freedom because persons disposed to live meaningful lives must shape their lives by making choices
for themselves (Nozick, 1974, p.50). Independent of perspective, there is a close
connection between the assessment of the process and the understanding and
perceived value of the corresponding outcome.

The following section overview shows how I propose to go about examining the
relationship between mobility and freedom. The next (second) section shows how
ambiguities in the assessment of auto-mobility and mobility-based lifestyles are
evident even from the perspective of freedom. The distinction between transport and
mobility is important throughout the essay and is at the core of the mobility/transport
dilemma of the third section. The potentiality of transport is essential to
freedom, but sufficiently many have to actually travel in order to sustain the supply
safeguarding the potentiality. The fourth section offers an application of Amartya
Sen’s liberal paradox to the problem of guaranteeing the right to mobility. The
contention is that mobility rights are not viable in a society respecting unanimity,
because of a logical conflict between the categories involved. The ensuing section
discusses the opportunities for surveillance in the wake of transport. The electronic
tracks people leave when travelling can be exploited to threaten freedom as mobility.
The sixth section introduces power, trust, rules, and simultaneous presence and
absence as alternative responses to the uncertainty generated by other peoples’
mobility. The choice of reaction to others’ absence has profound implications for
freedom as mobility. Additional conclusions are highlighted in the final section.

**Freedom as Auto-mobility: Against Sedentary Metaphysics**

This section shows that ambiguities in the assessment of the social consequences of
modern transport also surface when looking at auto-mobility from the perspective of
freedom. The introductory positive views of freedom as mobility are followed by a
brief account of some negative external effects of auto-mobility – also couched in
terms of freedom. The ambiguities are particularly clearly reflected in the mutually
opposing lifestyles based on auto-mobility.

As could be expected, the automotive industry has strongly encouraged the
coupling of mobility and freedom. Three decades ago, the president of the Ford
Motor Company worried that ‘today, … mobility, our fifth freedom, is being
threatened, not by any foreign power or sinister conspiracy but by a tangle of well-
intentioned efforts that seek to drastically curtail the use of motor vehicles …’
(Iacocca, 1974, p.2). Mobility and freedom are still intertwined in the minds of
people today (Hamilton & Hoyle, 1999, pp.76–80). Freydendal-Pedersen (2005,
p.39), Hagman (2003, p.3), and Jensen (1999) report that most of their interviewees
say that the car provides freedom – the freedom to go wherever one wants, whenever
one wants.

Freedom as mobility may be valued for two main reasons. First, the possibility of
travelling might be valued in itself. In order to experience freedom as potential
travel, there must be possibilities allowing for more transport than the number of
trips actually taken. The individual must also be in a position to autonomously
decide whether to act on the possibilities. That is, the potentiality aspect of mobility
means that the individual has a choice between travelling and not travelling. This is
an essential aspect of freedom as mobility; freedom of movement implies the right
not to move.
Second, the possibility to travel might have instrumental value in that the choice set (the set of commodity bundles and activities) available to the individual might be enlarged. This can enable the individual to make choices that raise preference fulfilment to a higher level, and thus increase the individual’s available utility. To take advantage of the increased opportunity to achieve, the individual has to travel and thus transform mobility into revealed transport.

Widespread mobility, and auto-mobility in particular, has obvious indirect consequences that detract from the common welfare in terms of freedom as well as economic efficiency. Autonomy regarding transport may be translated into the individual right to travel where, when, and how one wishes (Hiscock et al., 2002). However, in the case of the automobile, having all the levers of control in one’s own hands is likely to lead to encroachment on others’ private spheres. Noise and pollution from my driving might interfere with others’ sleep, health, and enjoyment of attractive environments. Furthermore, congestion and barriers point to a conflict between personal autonomy in mobility matters and others’ opportunity to achieve.

Extensive driving causes delays and waiting time, which have a bearing on freedom. Waiting time (Gasparini, 1995) is also an intrinsic feature of most public transport systems. In the extreme case in which one would have to wait forever in order to take advantage of an option in the choice set, that particular option is not really available. Generally, extended waiting time makes the choice set less valuable and might detract from the freedom of choice. There is an analogy between waiting time and transport time when it is assumed that transport is without inherent utility. Time spent on transport is then part of the time the individual has to wait to take part in a desired activity. An option requiring extremely long transport time is not really available. Thus, transport involving too long distances in time and space, compared with what is found reasonable, affects freedom of choice negatively. Great distance brings net gains towards zero; and in the extreme case, the option of participating in the particular activity will be more of an illusion than a real possibility.

In recent years, big differences in mobility have been linked to the problems of social exclusion (Cass et al., 2005; Lyons, 2003). This has strengthened the interest in the borderland between mobility and freedom, even though social exclusion refers more broadly to disadvantage, injustice, alienation, and lack of freedom. Referring back to Sen’s concepts of freedom described earlier, social exclusion affects the positive freedom to choose between different ways of living, and it thus constrains the pursuit of substantive opportunities. The literature on social exclusion often deals with the right to participate in major social arenas such as employment, health care, and education — or, more generally, people’s ability to participate in activities, obtain resources, and benefit from opportunities. For some — Pritchard (2000), for example — mobility is a wholly inadequate index of freedom. She finds it ‘scandalous to continue valorizing the rhetoric of mobility when so many persons cannot move about as the elite do and when so many are desperately seeking safe shelter’ (Pritchard, 2000, p.59).

As shown earlier, the assessment of auto-mobility might be ambiguous, because the positive and negative consequences are both great. The effects of auto-mobility are also ambiguous when it comes to ways of life. Over the years, the private car has inspired contrasting lifestyles based on mobility, both the ‘freedom’ of the road...
movie and the ‘conservatism’ of the low-density suburb (Carrabine & Longhurst, 2002, p.181). Jain (2002, p.388) points to the mobile home as a phenomenon linking these contrasts: ‘The “mobile home” makes manifest the class ambivalences of mobility as that scrap of Americana stuck between the flux of freeway and suburb – idealizing wanderlust as it frustrates others’ attempts to overtake the slow unwieldy vehicles’.

A number of theorists regard recourse to mobility as one type of resistance to the routine of everyday life (Bridge, 2004; de Certeau, 1984; Cohen & Taylor, 1992; Joyce, 2003, pp.210–233) or as a central trope for anti-systemic movements of one kind or another (Cresswell, 2001, p.15). ‘Nothing is further from bourgeois civilization … than an existence based on a refusal to put down roots’ (Prato & Treviro, 1985, pp.39–40). Mobility and travelling are considered a strategy of resistance against rootedness and traditional values. For instance, Kerouac’s (1957) *On the Road* represents a form of resistance to the ‘establishment’.

The mobile lifestyle of the main characters raises questions about the value of ideas such as roots, community, home, and neighbourhood (Cresswell, 1993, p.258). Their criss-crossing of the North-American continent by automobile relates to the experience of having autonomy over the processes shaping their own lives. Kerouac boosts non-stop ‘going’ for its own sake as the main joy; freedom as mobility is celebrated as intrinsically valuable. This is underlined by the aimlessness of the journeys. The unruly directionless movement of the central figures reinforces their freedom as mobility, as it means they do not have to go any particular place.

Mobility in physical space is about the ability to link places. The desirability of mobility does not primarily spring from disillusionment with some places and the need to access other places. Mobility may be more about creating a pattern, a tapestry of familiar places, in order to gain knowledge of, master, and feel at home in a larger geographical space. In contrast to the rootlessness alluded to above, therefore, the aim might be to take root in a vastly expanded area. The improved mastering relates to the opportunity aspect of freedom. What is achieved is a feeling of having a much enlarged choice set at one’s disposal. Cresswell captures this point well when summing up the motives of the restless and footloose characters in Kerouac’s novel. All their frantic movement is to answer a question ‘connected to what it is like to be an American in America rather than just a resident in “anytown” USA’ (Cresswell, 1993, p.260).

**The Mobility/Transport Dilemma**

This section exploits the difference between the potential character of mobility and the revealed nature of transport to examine an analogy to Rousseau’s (1968 [1762]) ‘forced-to-be-free’ dilemma. The case of groups that are repeatedly denied residence permits and the case of excessive travelling due to a society tailored to the automobile are both considered. The section also examines whether planning for transport can in some way distort freedom as mobility.

Bauman (2000) emphasises that mobility and power are intertwined. Partly for this reason, mobility is not a good that tends to be equally distributed among people; rather, it tends to reflect power differences. According to Bauman, ‘people who move and act faster … are now the people who rule’ (2000, p.119). If this is so, it is
not an unambiguous tendency, however. Albertsen and Diken (2001) note that whereas mobility is a matter of choice for some, for others it is a fate. Some people are constantly forced to move on and are denied the right to settle down in a suitable place. ‘Do we dare assume that their mobility, their border-crossing is liberating?’, Pritchard (2000, p.59) asks rhetorically. Compelled movement creates problems for an ideology that associates mobility with freedom. It would seem that these displaced people, always being passed on to another territory and another authority, are forced to be free in the sense of being mobile. However, this counterintuitive result is problematic only when mobility is defined as revealed transport. In this essay mobility is defined as potential transport, and it is stressed that freedom of movement implies the right not to move. It is thus clear that the potentiality aspect of mobility prevents an awkward problem concerning mobility’s relationship to freedom.

The possibility that individuals might be forced to be free was discussed by Jean-Jaques Rousseau as part of his work on participative democracy. The aim here is to reformulate the dilemma in a mobility context. The collective decision-making body might provide mobility to the population, but in order to succeed the decision-makers might have to organise society so as to ensure a high volume of transport (or person-kilometres). Private investment in transport infrastructure and vehicles will not be generated without anticipated demand. A break-even point for the established supply might require more travelling than most people are comfortable with. Focusing on freedom as mobility, one could say that the mobile population is in this case forced to be free. However, it seems to be a contradiction in terms that freedom can be forced on the citizens (Simhony, 1991).

In general, this paradoxical situation might arise in a market society where freedom is associated with a high and diversified transport supply, which gives ample opportunities for choice. The problem is that high supply will not be offered in the market in the absence of high demand. Hence, the ability to enjoy the services of the producers is conditional on high willingness to pay among the consumers. They have to reveal their high demand. If they choose not to travel, they will lose the opportunity to travel. Actual transport is a prerequisite for mobility. Consumers do not escape the constraining have to if they want to enjoy the freedom of having the opportunity to. They have to make a lot of trips in order to be mobile – even in the sense of being potentially able to travel. In this lies the parallel to Rousseau’s forced-to-be-free dilemma.

Because of the $1/n$ effect, the single individual is not likely to feel that the requirement for a sufficient overall volume of trips limits his or her freedom. Each individual relies on the others to do the travelling and feels no personal responsibility to pay for the supply that essentially provides mobility. The favourable view of freedom as mobility, freedom as potential transport, depends on the majority’s belief that they could actually travel far less and still maintain their existing level of mobility. However, if too many individuals were to enjoy merely the potentiality of transport, the system would break down. In many cases, planners counteract this breakdown, although not necessarily consciously. The more transport they plan for, the more society is designed in ways making people dependent on transport, and the less opportunity remains to enjoy mobility in the sense of potential transport.

A threat to the idea of freedom as mobility comes from the behavioural principle of maximising a notion of utility made up entirely from the consumption of goods
and services, as is standard procedure in economics. Freedom as mobility, as potential transport, has no explicit value in this maximisation process. The difference between potential and actually implemented transport is of no significance to human action with this idea of utility. The intrinsic ‘value’ of any potential travelling would be offset by the slightest increase of utility stemming from the commodity bundle that might be acquired on an extra trip.

When everything is connected to everything else in physical space in a vast and seamless web, when ‘distance is dead’ and zero friction has brought cause and effect into an intimate embrace, nothing can be controlled unless everything is controlled. Then the prediction paradigm of planners (Sager, 2005) makes them enemies of freedom. Predictability comes at the expense of flexibility. To the degree that transport planners successfully control ever more variables that might possibly be obstacles to prediction, utility maximisation and transport in search of better bargains, freedom as mobility is lost.8 What from the perspective of transport planners appears as the fatal flaw in their art – their inability to eliminate friction, the Herculean task of turning physical space into an integrated and fine-woven structure of premium circulation networks – is instead the condition of freedom. Where the circulation systems become indeterminate, in the gaps between them, the high-friction interstices and transfer points, we might exercise the independent choice of keeping further movement as a potentiality. We can stop to think, exit the system if we so wish, and in this respect we are autonomous (compare Friedmann, 1979, p.38).

In the quest for freedom, the main point is not necessarily to cross borders, but to exploit the ambiguity of the border zone. Crossing borders is often to move from one system, one solid structure, and one firmly cemented tangle of power relations to another. Escape means to exploit the possibilities, weaknesses, and uncoordinated control found in the gaps between the systems. Sometimes it is a question of rejecting the either/or, breaking with the regimentation of code/space-formatted premier circulation systems, and playfully exploring the scope for hybrid movement, using low-tech modes on part of the journey. Escape for some groups in some settings is as incredibly easy as walking out a door. For others, formal restrictions, deep-seated habits, or internalised conventions raise almost insurmountable barriers in matters of mobility (Gerzina, 2001).

When transport becomes too easy, ‘excess travel’ proliferates (Handy et al., 2005), and the domain of potentiality is shrinking. Paradoxically, when distance is dead, so is freedom as mobility. The self-destructive capacity of omnipotence, Hegel’s vivid description of the lord destroying himself as master the moment he destroys the slave, is also recognised in this ambivalence (Bernstein, 1971, pp.26–27). Just when the planners seem to have succeeded completely, when control is gained over the last variable that could possibly interfere with movement, transport planning has demolished its own rationale of freedom as mobility. There is no longer any reason not to travel. Potential transport becomes an oxymoron, and no one rests in peace.

In the earlier paradox lies the liberating potential of the Slow City movement. ‘It is an ambitious grassroots movement that aims to reinvent every aspect of urban life, by putting pleasure before profit, human beings before head office, slowness before speed’ (http://www.freecycles.org/slowlink.html, accessed 6 April 2005). Since 1999, more than 30 Italian towns have pledged to turn themselves into havens from the...
high-speed frenzy of the global economy. Their guidelines suggest that there might be freedom as well as hedonic pleasure to be gained from doing everything in a less frenetic, less homogenised manner (http://www.massamarittima.info/eventi/citta_slowuk.htm, accessed 6 April 2005). Albertsen and Diken (2001, p.22) reach a similar tentative conclusion trying to establish a critique of mobility: ‘If mobility transcends all critique … then criticism must be anti-mobile: slow down; localize!’.

The Impossibility of Mobility Rights in a Society that Respects Unanimity

Rights can be seen as manifestations of negative freedom. This section deals with the right to mobility, and the focus is on an exemplification of Amartya Sen’s (1970) liberal paradox. The section shows that the right of individuals to decide their own level of mobility cannot logically be combined with the democratic society’s respect for unanimity. The section starts with some general observations on mobility as a right.

The distinction between potential and revealed transport is a parallel to the difference between having rights and exercising them. The concept of mobility as potential transport is analogous to defining a right as something that does not necessarily have to be exercised (Dowding & van Hees, 2003). Obviously, if rights cannot be exercised, then they hardly seem worth the name – just as there is no mobility unless travelling is actually a feasible option.

Travelling is here associated with liberation, and mobility with freedom. Liberation does not have any value in itself, only as a precondition for freedom. The outcome – freedom – is what counts and what people have preferences attached to. Rights are of greatest consequence when defined in relation to something that is positively valued. Therefore, rights should concern mobility rather than transport. Moreover, the potentiality aspect is important in the formulation of a right. If no potentiality is present, meaning that a particular trip has to be realised, then taking that trip is more of an obligation or duty than a right. Revealed transport is, however, required to exercise mobility rights. It seems probable that rights never exercised will gradually wither away, so transport is needed in order to maintain mobility rights. The freedom is in knowing for certain that transport opportunities are available. Kerouac’s (1957) view in On the Road, on the other hand, is that transport is needed because the liberating movement itself is what engenders the feeling of being free.\footnote{As underscored by Hayek (1944, p.45), ‘[w]e can unfortunately not indefinitely extend the sphere of common action and still leave the individual free in his own sphere’. By regulating the private sphere, one draws the limits of social action and demarcates the set of issues that can legitimately be objects of public planning. In a liberal society, public planning deals only with issues that are not in anybody’s private sphere. Sen’s (1970) logical proof of the impossibility of combining individual rights with respect for social unanimity affirms the profundity of Hayek’s problem. The liberal paradox has withstood a generation of intense scholarly scrutiny, and the current status of the debate is summarised by Sen (2002b, pp.652–658). Examples of Sen’s result that are relevant to planning and are applied to privacy and loyalty are provided by Sager (2002). It is convenient here to follow Binmore’s introduction to Sen’s liberal paradox:}
Sen’s (1970) proposed definition is the best known of the various attempts to formalise the notion of a right. His definition of a minimal right requires that each citizen be a dictator over at least one pair of social alternatives. For example, if Adam has a right to decide how he dresses, then he is a dictator over at least one pair of alternatives, \(a\) and \(b\), which are identical except that Adam wears his figleaf in \(a\) but goes naked in \(b\). This definition leads immediately to Sen’s Paradox of the Paretian Liberal, which says that a society cannot simultaneously allow even the most minimal of rights to each citizen without violating the Pareto principle. (Binmore, 1996, p.71)

Everything that matters about Sen’s paradox can be expressed by reference to a situation in which a collective decision is to be made by only two citizens, Pi (pro immigration) and Ai (against immigration). Moreover, we need only consider the case in which the set of social states among which they must make a communal choice contains three alternatives, \(a\), \(b\), and \(c\). A social welfare function aggregates Pi’s and Ai’s preference relations over the three alternatives and expresses the result as a collective preference ranking. All preference relations are assumed to be transitive. That is, if \(a\) is ranked above \(b\), and \(b\) is ranked above \(c\), then \(a\) must be ranked above \(c\). Sen also requires that the collective preference satisfy the Pareto principle: for all alternatives \(a\) and \(b\), if Pi ranks \(a\) above \(b\) and Ai ranks \(a\) above \(b\), then the social welfare function should rank \(a\) above \(b\) and thus respect unanimity. The collective preference ranking can be established for any logically possible configuration of individual preference relations.

In the following example, both Pi and Ai realise that high mobility has the potential to change preferences. Pi hopes and Ai fears that acquaintance with immigrants (whether in their countries of origin or in the already cosmopolitan capital of Pi’s and Ai’s country) will lead to higher tolerance for a multicultural society. Imagine now that high mobility comes in the form of a generous travel grant offering the receiver repeated journeys. Admirable social and cultural work in the home town that they share has made both Pi and Ai worthy candidates for the grant. However, the rules of this prize allow it to be offered to only one individual in a town. Should it be turned down by the candidate, the grant that year is transferred to another town. Hence, if Pi is offered the grant, she has the right to choose between accepting it or letting the grant go on to a neighbouring town. Ai has the right to make an analogous decision, should he be offered the grant. Thus, each citizen has the right to determine his or her own level of mobility, meaning that the individual’s decision cannot be overruled by any collective decision-making body (the social welfare function). It is also assumed that society is democratic in the sense that, when all the citizens agree about something, this will be the outcome of the collective decision process. In other words, the society is liberal in that it respects rights and democratic in that it respects unanimity (the Pareto principle). Sen’s (1970) ‘liberal paradox’ shows that this combination of procedural, political qualities is impossible, however. The present mobility example illustrates this logical impossibility.

The preferences of Pi and Ai are now explained. Pi is sympathetic to the variety of a culturally diversified society. Her worst alternative is \(c\), implying that Pi and Ai both stay in their home town. Then Pi will not be able to enjoy the liveliness of a multicultural city, and Ai will not be confronted with new experiences – which he
strongly needs to be, in Pi’s opinion. Pi thinks that Ai’s mistrust of foreigners is a very deplorable cultural influence in their home town, paving the way for outright racism, so she thinks it more important that Ai be exposed to the attractive vitality of a multicultural city than getting the opportunity to enjoy it herself.

The worst alternative for Ai, looking at the prospect of immigrant activity in his beloved home town with suspicion, is that Pi returns from her journeys with even more enthusiasm for new and strange ideas and interests. It would be better if he received the grant himself, as he trusts himself not to be impressed by what he might experience in other cities. It would be preferable that none of them travelled, however. Then he could stay where he likes best, and Pi would stay at home too, hopefully developing a liking for local traditions and customs.

The impossibility of a mobility-liberal and rights-granting democratic society can now be demonstrated:

- Two individuals:
  - Pi: pro immigration
  - Ai: against immigration

- Three alternatives:
  - a: Pi receives increased mobility (she accepts the travel grant)
  - b: Ai receives increased mobility (he accepts the travel grant)
  - c: Mobility is unchanged for both Pi and Ai (neither Pi nor Ai accepts the grant)

- Preferences:
  - Pi: c < a < b
  - Ai: a < b < c

- Characteristics of the society:
  - Right allotted to Pi: c < a
  - Right allotted to Ai: b < c
  - Pareto condition: a < b

- From the above characteristics follow the collective preferences: b < c < a < b
- These collective preferences are intransitive; that is, they reveal a decision cycle. A contradiction has therefore been reached.

The decision cycle that is generated shows that the right to determine one’s own mobility level cannot be respected in a democratic society committed to the Pareto principle. The decision cycle would make the social outcome arbitrary. Citizens may be mobile, but their claims to mobility cannot be articulated as ‘rights’, as Sen (1970) defines this concept. If we agree with Sen, freedom as mobility cannot be enjoyed as a right in democratic societies, despite the statement to the contrary in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. When one individual has the provision of his or her mobility needs accepted as the right to be decisive over one pair of alternatives, no other individual can have any rights.

Mobility can of course be increased in several ways, the travel grant example is chosen just to bring in as few distracting considerations as possible. Alternatively,
one group of workers might be offered an express bus to an industrial area, for
instance, and another group might benefit from a school bus for their children. This
would introduce group rights instead of individual rights. However, Stevens and
Foster (1978) and Gekker (1985) have shown that impossibilities similar to Sen’s
liberal paradox still hold.

Defining rights in terms of decisiveness in the choice between alternatives, as in the
above example, makes it difficult to distinguish between having rights and exercising
them. Pi strictly prefers $a$ to $c$ and, by Sen’s account of rights, is decisive in the social
choice between $a$ and $c$. ‘The fact that a person has a strict preference and is decisive
entails that the social preference relation is partly fixed; that is, that having rights is
equivalent to exercising them’ (Dowding & van Hees, 2003, p.284). Yet the
distinction between having and exercising a right is often important. For example, if
Ai receives the travel grant, Pi’s power to impose $a$ on society instead of $c$ is still a
right she has, although the choice of $a$ is now merely hypothetical.

Sen’s impossibility result remains valid but can now be understood as the
impossibility of translating all relevant hypothetical choices into one coherent
collective preference relation. Dowding and van Hees conclude that individuals
cannot always exercise their rights simultaneously (2003, p.284). It does not follow
that they do not have those rights, but the distinction between having and exercising
rights makes the example above less counterintuitive.

Like norms and laws, rights are not automatically respected. Social institutions for
enforcement are needed to sanction individuals who violate the rights of others. Enforceement
institutions must have power and might thus be embryonic control
bureaucracies. There is a delicate dialectic between freedom-enhancing rights and the
potentially repressive institutions protecting them. Even more troubling are the
surveillance mechanisms designed to make sure that exercising the freedom of
mobility does not spill negatively into the utility maximising processes of others.
These mechanisms are discussed in the next section.

**Tracks: Surveillance in the Wake of Transport**

Mobile subjects have to be disciplined in order to ensure safe and efficient transport
and circulation systems. Disciplining is a broader notion than surveillance: it
requires a technology of power ‘that reappears with regularity across the social
plane, reasserting itself in various sectors, creating a grid of possibilities not
primarily aimed to limit actions, but to speed up and standardize specific actions’
(Packer, 2003, p.144). Although limiting action may not be the main purpose,
disciplining affects even the potentiality aspect of mobility. For instance, women
may be disciplined to stay at home even if transport alternatives are available. Packer
(2003, p.140) argues that mobile subjects must be highly disciplined, as they are not
always within the immediate scope of state interaction and might, in certain
conditions, do harm to the state. This section analyses surveillance as a set of
disciplining technologies.

Mobility and freedom characterise states or situations, while transport and
liberation require action. Given an imperfect vantage point (lack of freedom),
freedom depends on liberation, and mobility will not be established without
transport. Once the mobile state is established, the potentiality aspect of mobility can
be seen as \textit{ex ante} in relation to transport. That is, the possibility of transport exists first, then one decides whether the transport will actually be employed. Transport also has \textit{ex post} characteristics in that it leaves tracks – electronically or as physical marks. In contrast with the \textit{ex ante} attribute that is associated with freedom, the \textit{ex post} tracks are associated with control. Potentiality opens doors for alternative actions, while tracks attest to the choice of one alternative and the foreclosure of the rest. Tracks betray the particular actions actually chosen and undertaken. The effects of tracks on freedom as mobility are discussed later.

Surveillance systems help answer the questions of who is where, at what point in time, and what they are doing. Some systems are designed to sort people’s activities and characteristics for marketing or profiling purposes. They capture information about people’s demographic characteristics, preferences, communications, consumer transactions, and movements in order to more effectively manipulate them to buy products or behave in prescribed ways (Clarke, 2000, 2003). Compare Molz’s (2006, p.380) mentioning of ‘cookies’ that record how users surf the Internet, which websites they visit, and which links they use. With the surveillance of movement between workplace, store, home, and so forth, there is potentially no hiding. ‘There is no room to anonymously walk down a street, drive through a neighborhood, or talk on the phone … The objects we use (cars, phones, computers, electricity) … become tools for surveillance. Actions, conversations, movements are all caught. Movement is not a means of evading surveillance but has become the subject of surveillance’ (Bennett & Regan, 2004, p.453). Road tolling systems, cellphone locators, and traffic control monitors keep track of movement, and data from these can – within legal limits – be integrated with other kinds of information such as closed circuit television (CCTV) or data recording economic transactions. Molz (2006, p.379) concludes that ‘t[he more we move and communicate, the more we are tracked and recorded’.

Tracks can be used for surveillance and violation of privacy (Sager, 1998). In combination with accessibility and hypermobility (Sager, 2005), tracks provide perfect conditions for surveillance. When all places are accessible and within almost instant reach, anybody can be on the spot anytime. It is especially threatening when friction between private and public spheres is reduced. Clearly, the relationship between freedom and the defeat of friction is ambiguous. New opportunities for the individual and new possibilities of control are simultaneously provided for. This is a reminder that aspects of freedom may contradict each other; in this case, freedom as a large choice set that implies transport and freedom as lack of external control. Typically, surveillance is intense at the hubs, terminals, and transfer points where the potential for freedom is highest (Adey, 2004; Müller & Boos, 2004). Airports are symbols of mobility but also filters that sort travellers at coded gates.

Tracks in combination with insignificant friction lead society towards electronic panopticism (Lyon, 1993).\(^\text{10}\) Again, it is the mobility of the watchers, and not their actual following of the tracks, which is the foundation of the efficient surveillance system. Behaviour is regulated through the travellers’ knowledge that they might be watched by anybody with an interest in doing so, as transport and accessibility to any place are so easily and momentarily obtainable. For example, some believe that ‘You’ll never walk alone’ has a double meaning in Liverpool because of the extensive use of CCTV in the central city streets (Coleman & Sim, 2000).
The excuse for surveillance is often security, as in the technical code/space of airports. ‘Code/space allows the surveillance of passengers and workers to become more panoptic in scope, both widening and deepening the extent to which air travel can be policed and thus made a more secure and safe undertaking’ (Dodge & Kitchin, 2004, p.206). Code/space in air transport includes travel websites, check-in, security checkpoints, flight decks, air-traffic control, immigration and customs checkpoints (ibid., p.195). Code/space interferes directly with freedom by enforcing a regulatory environment in which passengers are rendered ‘docile bodies’ (Foucault’s term) that pass through the circulation system in an orderly, non-complaining, compliant manner (Dodge & Kitchin, 2004, p.199). Wood and Graham (2006) find that advanced software is sluicing the urban, travelling population through expanding networks of ‘gates’, sorting people into manageable flows.

The concepts of privacy and personal autonomy are closely affiliated. Autonomy has to do with the regulation of the private sphere, while privacy is about the ability to keep others outside it. One cannot have privacy without a private sphere; that is, without a degree of autonomy. And one cannot enjoy autonomy without privacy, because frequent transgression erodes the borders of the private sphere (McLean, 1995, p.48). The core of privacy is controlling access and transactions across the border of a private sphere from where the individual decides when to go public. The private sphere is not delimited only by a geographical border, as in ‘my home is my castle’; it is also determined by what are considered intimate or personal matters. The individual controls what – from this sphere – is made known to others or communicated about him or her. There is limited access for others to gather information, observe, decide, or obtain physical contact.

It is ironic that the quest for privacy tends to result in access control with surveillance, because privacy is also looked to as protection against surveillance. Nevertheless, ‘much surveillance occurs because in the world of modernity people prefer a “private” existence, which prompts the development of systems to authenticate their activities in the “public” world … Presenting a driver’s license to a police officer from within a private car makes the point well’ (Lyon, 2002, p.1).

Neoliberalism emphasises privatisation and a shrinking public realm. It is puzzling that this free market ideology demands more protection of property and profit, and therefore stricter control of individuals who threaten this basis of capitalism, which ultimately results in more surveillance of all consumers. The expanding practice of urban public–private partnerships has turned it into a powerful mode of governance for economic growth and entrepreneurial politics in the city. One strategy has been to ‘reclaim’ city streets in an attempt to make the central districts safe for development (Fyfe & Bannister, 1998).

Neoliberal city building has been studied in Liverpool (Coleman, 2004a, 2004b), and some findings warrant mentioning in the context of mobility. As the CCTV cameras routinely monitor the streets of the central business district, they have become an instrument in constraining the mobility of certain groups. There is a ban on headgear of the type that makes identification difficult (hooded tops, baseball caps), so (mostly) young people can be stopped and told to remove headgear if they want to remain in the city centre. Skateboarding is considered an offence, because it allegedly scares off tourists and shoppers and gives the city a bad image. Bylaws curtail a range of spontaneous grassroots street protests. ‘Those walking the streets...
who are teenagers, dressed inappropriately and without branded shopping bags are likely targets of security personnel whose “nose” for suspicion has been directed at those who appear to be “walking or standing without due cause” (Coleman, 2004a, p.302). Large groups of teenagers might then face mobility restrictions. 11

To sum up, neoliberal city building encourages surveillance, which in turn leads to social sorting, social removal, and hence constraints on mobility. Surveillance is a technique for exerting power, while trust is its antipode. The balancing of the two strategies is related to freedom as mobility in the next section.

**Mastering the Uncertainties of Absence**

It is obvious from the previous section that mobility is part of a power game. Just as the seller’s price is the buyer’s cost, so the freedom of mobility experienced by one person might be conceived by another as a threat of intrusion. Greater mobility empowers some, while others will respond by developing control mechanisms. This section focuses on the balance between trust and power, but attention is also called to the fact that these are not the only responses to the challenges posed by absence following from mobility.

Freedom is not synonymous with having power. Nevertheless, when others do not respect non-interference constraints, the individual needs power to remain autonomous and protect his or her opportunity set. It is a central theme in the discourse on modernity that freedom is tied to the ability to create and shape one’s own future (Friedland & Boden, 1994, p.10), and power may well be conducive to this end. An individual might be vulnerable to interference not only from others in the immediate vicinity. In highly mobile societies, the controller and the respondent in a power relation will both know that the distance between them can be easily covered. ‘Mobility is what makes action at a distance possible’ (Albertsen & Diken, 2001, p.14). Mobility often works both ways in power relations, meaning that it can be used to resist and avoid encroachment as well as to interfere. For this reason, it is sometimes said that power is the capacity to escape (ibid., p.17).

Power is also seen as action at a distance, however (Willer, 2003). This is an extension of power beyond the single relationship (dyad). Similarly, freedom is the ability to protect one’s autonomy without actually having to physically address every source of potential interference. Hence, freedom is the capacity to make some things happen according to preference without being there, without – as a slave – having to struggle with every little chore that steals time and empties life of all potentiality. Therefore, freedom is not transport but mobility, which keeps open the choice between going and staying, as one’s objectives can be achieved either way.

Mobility is a pivotal characteristic of economically advanced western societies, and the constant balancing acts between going and staying, between presence and absence, ‘are therefore a fundamental tension of modernity’ (Friedland & Boden, 1994, p.6). What makes this important in the present context is that the other side of the coin is the tension between directly controlling somebody and trusting him or her. As Giddens writes:

Trust is related to absence in time and space. There would be no need to trust anyone whose activities were continually visible and whose thought processes
were transparent, or to trust any system whose workings were wholly known and understood. It has been said that trust is ‘a device for coping with the freedom of others’, but the prime condition of requirements for trust is not lack of power but lack of full information. (Giddens, 1990, p.33)

So trust is a human quality for coping with the freedom of others to be somewhere else, their intermittent absence from ‘NowHere’. Hence, trust is a way to cope with mobility. We trust that the other will be back, that his or her destination is as told, and that the purpose of the trip was honestly stated. Trust is the property required for mastering the adults’ variations of Freud’s ‘fort-da’ game of absence and presence.

Note, however, that trust is not the only way to master the lack of full information caused by another’s absence. The surveillance theme of the previous section suggests that contrasting strategies are at play. This is a reminder that freedom as mobility contains the seeds to very different developments of society.

A third strategy, in addition to trust and surveillance, aims to blur the difference between presence and absence (Callon & Law, 2004). Different circulation systems can coexist, and a person can be mobile in several of them simultaneously, often by applying computer-mediated communication. In this way, presence and absence can be achieved at the same time. Judging by the enormous increase in the use of mobile phones and the global proliferation of Internet cafés, this ability of multi-presence is highly valued. It would be futile to ask whether mobility produces presence or absence. It delivers both, which is a premise for the idea of freedom as potential travel.

There is even a fourth strategy for dealing with the uncertainty resulting from the mobility of others. The potential external effects of the absentee’s actions may be so severe that trust threatens to break down. In such situations, mobility regulating rules might be an alternative or a supplement to surveillance. These rules might target both sexes and all age groups, although children and women are constrained by more rules than men (Kantor, 2002; Wolff, 1993, p.229). Moreover, rules are put into force at all levels, from micro-authorities in the home to the government of nation-states. Rules may regulate local trips and international journeys, and they may be in effect under ordinary circumstances or only in times of crisis. The following list provides a few examples:

- Commanding children to return home before dark.
- Curfew rules, dusk-to-dawn curfew.
- Chaperone conventions.
- Restrictions on who is eligible to drive a car.
- Permission required to settle in another province.
- Visa and passport rules.
- Zones or districts closed to particular groups by road posts or check-ins.

Table 1 shows how the previously mentioned four ways for easing the tension caused by the mobility of others relate to potential travel (mobility) and revealed travel (transport). Two cells are empty, because trust is a strategy in this context only as long as the other is still present, while surveillance is meaningful only when a journey is actually taken.
There are other ways to deal with mobility-generated dissonance than those presented in Table 1. Examples are confinement, replacement of absentees, and restricting the accessibility of many places in order to make trust or control work better. The four strategies in the table have been selected in order to shed light on the implications of the distinction between mobility and transport.

Perhaps needless to say, rules regulating movement may well be more unjust and limit freedom more severely than the surveillance discussed earlier. Furthermore, these two responses to the uncertainty created by the mobility of others are not mutually exclusive alternatives. They can be – and are – used complementary to effectively undermine freedom as mobility for some groups (Coleman, 2004a, 2004b). For example, extensive use of CCTV in city centres can be combined with law-and-order politics deterring groups that are not considered to be attractive customers, such as beggars, vagrants, and ‘suspicious youths’ (Fyfe & Bannister 1998, p.262).

### Concluding Remarks

It is a widespread idea in the western world that much of what is experienced as freedom lies in motion. It has even been suggested that this idea springs from human nature, as studies of the behaviour of great apes conclude that they prefer freedom and mobility over close social ties (Maryanski & Turner, 1993). The typical situation in many countries has been to maximise the motorists’ freedom as mobility, while providing the users of public transport with an ‘acceptable’ minimum standard (Vigar, 2002, p.72). It is in line with this when ‘captive riders’ became a phrase reserved for public transit users (Ergün et al., 1999).

A discussion of some of the more general difficulties of maintaining freedom as mobility in a society where mobility is ever-increasing has been the purpose of this
There are advantages of connecting liberal notions of freedom with a concept of mobility based on the possibilities of travelling, as distinguished from actual transport. Freedom as potential travel avoids the difficulty that journeys might be forced, and it does not lead to the unreasonable conclusion that policies should maximise transport in order to enhance freedom. Furthermore, freedom seen as potential travel clarifies the distinction between having rights and exercising them. With the spread of on-the-road surveillance, more freedom is sometimes found by staying put (while retaining the possibility of moving), than by actually taking the trip while being controlled. Finally, the possibility of travel best captures the ambiguity and freedom potential embedded in simultaneous presence and absence allowed by new information and communication technologies. A few conclusions are as follows:

- The question of defining mobility as potential or revealed transport has great bearing on the meaning of freedom as mobility. Mobility as potential transport is preferred, because freedom as mobility then includes the option of not going.
- Mobility rights conflict with society’s respect for unanimity, when rights imply that each citizen be a dictator over at least one pair of social alternatives.
- The many systems of surveillance installed in modern transport networks indicate that mobility generates uncertainty and easily triggers the need for control.
- There are several ways of mastering the uncertainty following from imperfect information due to others’ absence. The strategies of trust, surveillance, mobility rules, and simultaneous presence and absence push society in very different directions with respect to freedom.

It is in the nature of liberal societies for some individuals to exploit the freedom of choice for self-serving purposes, even when the result takes away welfare from the collective. Khisty and Zeitler (2001) contend that the value of freedom has to be balanced against other aspects of mobility, and that freedom as mobility is not necessarily at the top of the hierarchy of values. The claim that motorists have a right to drive their cars wherever and whenever they wish overlooks the fact that freedom comes with social obligations. Freedom as mobility is part of a complex dialectic. The more the interaction between freedom and obligations of individuals is downplayed, the stronger will be the need of society to protect itself, and the more germinative will be the seeds of institutionalised control inherent in the dialectic of mobility.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Ragnvald Sagen and members of the MOTEROM network for having read and offered helpful criticism of this article.

Notes

1. Individuals might hold different opinions about what trips are possible and feasible. A distinction could thus be made between subjective and objective mobility. Subjective mobility takes us inside mental space.
2. Even if freedom is valued, it might still challenge the individual, and may even be unconsciously shunned. The view of freedom as an existential problem is evident in Fromm (1941) and Yalom (1980).

3. Malkki (1992, p.31) uses the phrase ‘sedentary metaphysics’ to describe ways of thinking that are rooted and bounded. She notes that there is a tendency in the modern world to locate people and identities in particular spaces and within particular boundaries. She also states that this way of thinking results in a tendency to perceive mobile people in negative ways.

4. Kaufmann (2002, p.58) finds things to be somewhat more complex, in that ‘nothing shows that the most spatially mobile people have more freedom in the way they conduct their lives’ (original italics). Yet he concedes that mobility gives new freedom to those people whose lifestyles are very much confined by spatial restrictions (ibid., p.58).

5. The freedom of the road is desired by a number of groups, not only bikers and truckers (Eyerman & Lofgren, 1995; Cohan & Hark, 1997). Packer (2002, p.49) notes that for a short period in the 1970s and the early 1980s ‘the trucker became an American icon; a noble, solitary figure personifying the open road, existential angst, and freedom. The truck driver was considered a modern day cowboy’.

6. Packer (2002) chronicles how independent US truckers used their mobility and citizen band radios to resist policies that caused them economic hardship. Note, however, that the association between mobility and freedom was established long before the automobile society. The connection was made even when there was no vehicle, vessel, or animal for transport. An example is found in Preble’s (1948) elegant novel for teenagers:

   The hero of Donna Preble’s thoroughly researched *Yamino-Kwiti: Boy Runner of Sibi*, is torn between desiring the thrills of the courier’s travelling life, following in his father’s footsteps, or being groomed to become a … priest … Finally Yamino-Kwiti gets his wish, as he is hired as a foot messenger by the Spanish explorer, Gaspar De Portolà. We last see him, ‘Flying along with winged feet … At last he was to be a courier and see the world!’ (Nabokov, 1981, p.17)

7. In Chapter 7 of *The Social Contract* on ‘the sovereign’ – that is, on the collective legislative body composed of as many members as there are voters in the assembly – the following passage is included:

   Hence, in order that the social pact shall not be an empty formula, it is tacitly implied in that commitment – which alone can give force to all others – that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the whole body, which means nothing other than that he shall be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to the nation, secures him against all personal dependence, it is the condition which shapes both the design and the working of the political machine, and which alone bestows justice on civil contracts – without it, such contracts would be absurd, tyrannical and liable to the grossest abuse. (Rousseau, 1968, p.64)

As an example, consider a city council decision that every taxpayer has to contribute to a light rail line and a bicycle track between a string of suburbs and the city centre. Citizens are forced to pay in order to enjoy freedom as mobility.

8. The idea for this and the following paragraphs is inspired by Friedmann’s analysis of conflicts between planning and freedom. ‘Our freedom is part of the uncertainty that renders social planning indeterminate’ (Friedmann, 1979, p.39). The reasoning here is a reminder of ‘the dark side’ of planning repeatedly discussed in current planning literature (Yiftachel, 1998; Allmendinger & Gunder, 2005).

9. Obviously, the concept of right is not only associated with driving a private car. Sauter (2002, p.4) holds that: ‘Walking has the character of a human right. It is elementary evidence of being human, an expression of personal freedom. Politically, however, there is a different perception: Driving not walking is considered a human right. The political agenda is set accordingly.’ Sauter points out that the motor vehicle’s invasion of the streets changed the situation for the pedestrian from free use of the street in most places to a systematic disciplining of walking and playing. According to Sauter, traffic education was much more than a safety measure; it was also a tool to teach individuals discipline and subordination. ‘It served as ideology in a time when totalitarian systems were sprouting up everywhere in Europe’ (Sauter, 2002, p.5). See also Sauter (2003).
10. ‘Originating as Jeremy Bentham’s eighteenth century architectural plan for a prison, the Panopticon became the centrepiece of Michel Foucault’s theory of surveillance. Although Foucault made no allusion to computers, the Panopticon now makes frequent appearances in discussions of electronic surveillance’ (Lyon, 1993, p.653). Foucault draws on Bentham’s work in *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1979), where ‘panopticism’ is the heading of the third chapter, and the physical layout of the Panopticon is described on page 200. The surveillance society, where invisible observers track our digital footprints, does indeed seem panoptic.

11. Joyce’s account of walking and the ideology of city parks in the second half of the nineteenth century makes one wonder how much of this intolerance for ‘deviating’ use of an urban area is new: ‘In British parks everything that could interfere with rational and uplifting walking was banned: gambling, dogs, drink, swearing, dirty clothes and games in the wrong parts of the park’ (Joyce, 2003, p.221).

12. *NowHere* is the title of Friedland and Boden’s (1994) anthology on space, time, and modernity. There has recently been a rethinking of the delicate and dynamic balance between space and time, and the editors use *NowHere* to depict the ambiguous reference points of modernity. ‘The experiential here and now of modernity is … in a real sense nowhere yet everywhere’ (Friedland & Boden, 1994, p.6).

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